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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
Sun Yat-sen was the first Third World revolutionary who dealt 
with all the major issues that would engage the developing countries 
in the twentieth century. Before the tum of the century he had iden-
tified economic development as critical to the survival and well-be-
ing of less developed nations. At almost the same time he identified 
nationalism as a functional necessity in that effort to survive and 
prosper. He also recognized that neither development nor national-
ist commitment could be sustained without justice. 
While traditionalist economists were still speaking of an inter-
national division of labor, in which some nations would forever re-
main producers of primary products while others devoted their 
energies to industry, Sun recognized that such arrangements could 
only lead to the subordination of some nations to others. While the 
political thinkers of the Western world were anticipating an "inter-
national world order"-whether socialist or capitalist-Sun recog-
nized that ours would be a time of nationalism. And long before a 
new breed of socialists would make their appearance-to speak of 
economic growth with equity-Sun had anticipated much of what 
they were to say. Sun's principal disability was having been born far 
in advance of his time. 
When Sun Yat-sen spoke of the economic modernization of 
China, and anticipated a massive transfer of Western capital, skills 
and technology to underwrite the process-he had anticipated the 
logic of the Marshall Plan by more than a quarter century. Only 
after the second world war did the advanced industrial nations begin 
to fully appreciate the interdependency of the international eco-
nomic system. They were then not only prepared to reconstruct the 
shattered economies of their former enemies, but they undertook to 
assist the less developed nations in their efforts to modernize and 
industrialize their productive systems. 
Those lesser developed economies that were to profit most as a 
consequence of that assistance were those animated by a coherent 
and responsible developmental program. When the United States 
undertook to aid the remnants of the Republic of China on Taiwan 
and associated territories, it found a leadership possessed of just such 
a general program of economic modernization. What resulted is 
now identified as one of the most remarkable developmental accom-
plishments of the second half of the twentieth century. With grants 
(1) 
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in aid and concessionalloans that but little exceeded the per capita 
average accorded developing recipients-and which was far less 
than that provided many others-the island of Taiwan went through 
a structural transformation that now finds it well within the ranks of 
the newly industrialized states. Its economy is broad and mature, 
and its population enjoys the second or third highest standard of liv-
ing to be found among the many nations of Asia. Moreover, that 
welfare is more equitably distributed than is the case among most of 
the nations of the world-more equitably than even some of the ma-
ture socialist states. 
The two essays that follow tell something of that story. The first 
is a revision of a communication first presented at the 34th Annual 
Meeting of the Western Political Science Association in San Fran-
cisco in 1980. The second is part of a presentation delivered before 
an Annual International Conference hosted by the Leonard Davis 
Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Je-
rusalem in 1981. Together they provide an outline of an impressive 
accomplishment-the accomplishment of a man and a people. 
Of the man, not enough has been said. He not only anticipated 
the nationalism that was to ultimately inspire all the developing na-
tions of the world-his was a humane and generous nationalism-
unlike the exacerbated nationalisms that have so grievously afflicted 
this century.1 He anticipated, and rejected, much of what passes as 
"dependency theory" in our own time-and the accomplishments on 
Taiwan were to provide the historic warrant for that rejection.2 He 
anticipated the strengths of a reformed Confucianism-and it is to 
the "Confucian ethic" that some attribute the accomplishments of 
Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong.3 
Recently, Harold Z. Schiffrin-whose own work provided much 
of the inspiration for the essays that follow-wrote the authors to tell 
l. See A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "Naziona!fascismo and the Revolu-
tionary Nationalism of Sun Yat-sen," Journal of Asian Studies, 39:1 (November 1979), 
pp. 21-37; Maria Hsia Chang," 'Fascism' and Modem China," The China Quarterly, 79 
(September 1979), pp. 553-567. 
2. See A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "Marxism, Sun Yat-sen, and the 
Concept of 'Imperialism,' " Pactfic Affairs, 55: I (Spring 1982), pp. 54-79; and Richard E. 
Barrett and Martin King Whyte, "Dependency Theory and Taiwan: Analysis of a Devi-
ant Case," American Journal of Sociology, 87:1 (March 1982), pp. 1064-1089. 
3. See A. James Gregor, "Confucianism and the Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen," 
Philosophy East and West, 31:1 (January 1981), pp. 55-70; A. James Gregor and Maria 
Hsia Chang, "Wang Yang-ming and the Ideology of Sun Yat-sen," Review of Politics, 
42:3 (July 1980), pp. 388-404; and Herman Kahn, World Economic Development 1979 
and Beyond (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979), pp. 118-123. 
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them of his experiences while on a visit to the mainland of China. 
He reported that the scholars there display a revitalized and renewed 
interest in the works of Sun. That is not hard to understand. The 
leadership that succeeded to power on the mainland of China in 
1949 never possessed a general notion of how economic development 
might proceed in that unhappy land. At best they inherited Stalinist 
strategies, Soviet institutions, and "anti-imperialist" dispositions. 
Today the Stalinism has been in part discounted, the institutions dis-
credited and the anti-imperialism mufiled-and a great intellectual 
discomfort seems to have settled everywhere. Against this kind of 
background, the ideas of Sun Yat-sen take on an immediate rele-
vance and coherence. 
The essays that follow attempt to suggest something of that rele-
vance and that coherence. It also tells something of the diligence 
and enterprise of the people of Taiwan. The authors would like to 
dedicate this small work to those ideas and to those people. 
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CHAPTER II 
Sun Yat-sen's Program for the Economic Modernization 
of China* 
Maria Hsia Chang 
For the most part, the specifically ideological convictions of Sun 
Yat-sen have been treated in a cavalier fashion in Western academic 
literature. More often than not, Sun's thought is characterized by 
Westerners as having been "changeable, superficial and vague." 1 
For Karl Wittfogel, Sun left a "contradictory" ideology that, at best, 
could provide only a "very imprecise program."2 M.N. Roy was 
even less generous. For Roy, "Sun Yat-sen was remarkably sterile in 
original thought. . . .As a matter of fact, he did not think; he only 
schemed .... Therefore, he failed to provide [his] movement with 
a comprehensive program."3 These kinds of judgments seem to be 
particularly prevalent in any consideration of Sun's program for the 
economic development and modernization of China. 
In the late 1930s an anonymous British critic dismissed Sun's 
economic program as "kindergarten economics," afllicted not only 
with "falsifications" and "absurdities," but characterized by "eco-
nomic heresies."4 More recently, there has been some serious analy-
sis of Sun's proposed economic policies-but these have been largely 
restricted to special constituent elements of those policies, rather 
than an effort to review his entire developmental program. 5 In effect, 
* A much revised version of a communication delivered before the 34th Annual 
Meeting of the Western Political Science Association (San Francisco, March 27-29, 
1980). The author wishes to acknowledge the support and assistance of the Institute of 
International Studies of the University of California, and the Pacific Cultural 
Foundation in the preparation of this manuscript. 
I. Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1971), p. 12. 
2. Karl A. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen: Aufzeichnungen eines chinesischen Revolutionaers 
(Berlin: Agis, n.d.), pp. 66, 118. 
3. M.N. Roy, Revolution and Counterrevolution in China (Calcutta: Renaissance, 
1946), pp. 256-57. 
4. "Saggitarius," The Strange Apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen (London: Heath Cranton, 
1939), pp. 160, 174. 
5. In this regard, the most significant Western works are those of Harold Z. Schif-
frin, particularly his insightful essay, "Sun Vat-sen's Early Land Policy: The Origin and 
Meaning of 'Equalization of Land Rights'," Journal of Asian Studies 16 (August 1957), 
549-64. C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot, New York: Columbia Uni-
versity, 1976) makes some allusion to Sun's grandiose schemes for railway development 
and his program for the acquisition of foreign loans to finance the economic develop-
ment of the nation, but there is no sustained effort to provide a general account of Sun's 
entire program. In the mid-1930s Kuen Tsiang provided a summary exposition of Sun's 
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the materials bearing on Sun's economic program that are readily 
available to Western scholars remain fragmentary and, by and large, 
superficial. There has been some effort by Chinese scholars to pro-
vide materials in English concerning Sun's economic programs, but 
to date most has been uncritical, very general, or self-serving.6 
·sun's ideas concerning the economic development and industri-
alization of China merit better treatment than they have, to date, 
received.7 His ideas are intrinsically interesting and they are pos-
sessed of a surprising degree of contemporary relevance. The polit-
ical leadership on Taiwan, for instance, at the very commencement 
of their developmental efforts, invoked the economic programs of 
Sun Yat-sen as the rationale behind their policies-and as recently 
as September 1979 Vice Premier Yu Ch'iu-li of the People's Repub-
lic of China (PRC) suggested that the regime on the Mainland might 
"learn from Taiwan" in the effort to modernize the economy of the 
nation.8 By implication-and quite independent of any intellectual 
obligation we may have to their responsible assessment-Sun's pro-
posals concerning the economic modernization of China seem to still 
possess significance and relevance. They deserve, as a consequence, 
more careful consideration than they have as yet received in the non-
Chinese language material available. 
To that end, there is a manner of representing Sun's ideas that, 
while remaining faithful to them, might render their coherence, seri-
general program without analytic commentary (Les origines economiques et politiques du 
socialisme de Sun Yat Sen [Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1933)). More insightful treat-
ment is to be found in Wou Saofong, Sun Yat-sen: sa vie et sa doctrine (Paris: Les 
presses universitaires de France, 1929). Li Ti-tsun's early article, "Sunyatsenian Princi-
ple of Livelihood," The Chinese Students' Monthly 24, 5 (March 1929), 219-31, 241, re-
mains among the better available in any Western language. 
6. For example, see Shih Chien-sheng, "The Min-sheng chu-i and the Economic 
Modernization in Taiwan," China Forum 4, 2 (July 1977), 79-100; Sun Chen, "A Com-
parison Between Min-sheng chu-i and the Collectivism of Chinese Communists," ibid., 
101-22; Hsu Yu-chu, "Min-sheng chu-i and the Planned Free Economy," ibid., 123-37; 
Wu Ts'ung-hsien, "Land to the Tiller: Theoretical Basis and Implementation," ibid., 
139-81; Hu Sheng-i, "The Theoretical Foundation of a Ming-sheng Welfare Society," 
ibid, 5, 1 (January 1978), 37-47. 
7. In this regard, see the comments by Benjamin Schwartz in his Foreword to Ed-
ward Friedman, Backward Toward Revolution: The Chinese Revolutionary Party (Berke-
ley: University of California, 1974). 
8. "Kuomintang Platform Adopted by the 7th National Convention (1952)," con-
tained as an Appendix to Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (Taipei: 
Sino-American, 1953), pp. 257-266. for an English language translation of Vice Premier 
Yu's remarks, see "We Must Learn from Taiwan," Inside China Mainland (Taipei: Insti-
tute of Current China Studies), December 1979, pp. 1-2. 
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ousness and contemporary relevance more immediately self-evident 
than has been the case to date. At the very center of Sun's political 
convictions was an abiding preoccupation with the modernization 
and economic development of his nation. In one sense or another, 
all of his ideas can be shown to tum on the issue of China's eco-
nomic modernization-the systematic and self-sustaining expansion 
of its agricultural and industrial productivity. 
In 1894, in his first public statement-a reform proposal submit-
ted to the Imperial Grand Secretary of Chihli province, Li Hung-
chang9-Sun Yat-sen addressed himself to the necessity of rapidly 
modernizing China's economy. He spoke of the need to construct 
vast systems of transport-the necessary infrastructure of a modem 
economy-roads, railways, and water passages. He spoke of the 
need for rapid means of communication-telegraphic and steamship 
lines-to service the needs of a growing economy. He spoke of the 
need to introduce modem techniques of plant and animal hus-
bandry-the extensive use of chemical fertilizers, scientific methods, 
and machinery-to offset the low yields that acted as disincentives to 
agricultural production and contributed to the oppressive poverty of 
the vast rural areas of retrograde China. He spoke of the introduc-
tion of machine manufacture, modem educational and financial in-
stitutions, and the superintendence of law, all in order to foster the 
dissemination of scientific knowledge, and allow the individual se-
curity, enterprise and mobility requisite to the development of a 
modem China. The effort was required not only to afford the nation 
the strength to resist the depredations of the foreign powers that eve-
rywhere threatened China's integrity and sovereignty, but in order to 
serve "the people's livelihood (min-chien yang-sheng )," effacing the 
bitter poverty that weighed so heavily on his conationals. 
The concern with the "livelihood of the people" was, of course, 
traditional among Chinese thinkers, and found expression in a vari-
ety of forms. It appears regularly in Confucian and neo-Confucian 
texts. By 1895, Sun used the shorter form, min-sheng, to express that 
same concern in the four-point program of the Hsing-chung hui-the 
organization that was to serve as the forerunner of the revolutionary 
T'ung-meng hui, and the subsequent Kuomintang. Whatever the 
form, the expression, "the people's livelihood," when employed by 
Sun, came to mean a collection of renovative and developmental 
9. Sun Yat-sen, "Shang Li Hung-chang ch'en chiu-kuo ta-chi-shu" [Memorial to Li 
Hung-chang on the Plan to Save the Nation), in Kuo-.fu ch'uan-chi [171e Complete Works 
of Sun Yat-sen], (Taipei: Kuo-mintang Party History Committee, 1973, 1973), 3, 1-11. 
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programs calculated to increase the productivity of agriculture, de-
velop the transportation and communications infrastructure of the 
nation, establish modem schools and industries, and introduce codes 
for the governance of social and political life, finance, and 
commerce. 
The expressions min-sheng and kuo-chi min-sheng were formu-
lations used by many of Sun's contemporaries to signify a similar 
collection of programmatic concerns. A min-sheng program would 
provide for the people, and the people would support a vast program 
of industrialization and modernization that would make China suffi-
ciently strong and united to resist the threat of dismemberment and 
colonization. Years later Tai Chi-t'ao was to identify the principle 
of the people's livelihood as Sun's central preoccupation-a princi-
ple if implemented would bring not only well-being to the masses, 
but "salvation" to the nation. 10 Min-sheng, in effect, involved the 
most critical aspirations of Sun Yat-sen. 
Long before he could have known anything systematic about 
Western social and economic thought, Sun Yat-sen had already put 
together his first ideas about the modernization and development of 
China. He employed the term min-sheng to refer to those ideas, and 
min-sheng was to occupy the critical center of the final doctrinal 
statement of his views in the San-min chu-i delivered shortly before 
his death in 1925. 
Between 1894 and 1925, of course, the doctrine of min-sheng 
was to take on increasing complexity and increasing sophistication. 
Nevertheless, its central themes were to remain remarkably constant. 
A concern for the livelihood of the people entailed a commitment to 
the agricultural and industrial development of China in order to pro-
vide for its independence and sovereignty in the face of multiple ex-
ternal threats. Thus, neither a concern with the "social question," 
nor a preoccupation with "imperialism," were late in occupying Sun. 
As early as 1894, he conceived both subject to resolution if only 
China could be rapidly modernized and industrialized. It was a con-
viction that he was never to abandon. 
By 1895, Sun no longer entertained the hope that China's devel-
opment might be accomplished through political reform of the 
Manchu government. He became an advocate of the revolutionary 
10. See Key Ray Chong, "Cheng Kuan Ying (1841-1920): A Source of Sun Yat-sen's 
Nationalist Ideology?" Journal of Asian Studies, 28, 2 (February 1969); Tai Chi-t'ao, JJie 
geistigen Grundlagen des Sun Yat Senismus (Berlin: Wuerfel, 1931 ), p. II. For the earli-
est employments of the term "min-sheng," see Sun Tzu-ho, "The Political Program of the 
Hsing-chung hui," China Forum, 3, 2 (July 1976). 
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overthrow of Imperial rule. But whatever his convictions concerning 
the instrumental roles of reform or revolution, he continued to ad-
dress himself to the same problems with which he had grappled in 
his reform petition to Governor Li Hung-chang. Thus in 1897, even 
after he had given himself over to political revolution, and had been 
recognized as a dangerous revolutionary by the government, Sun 
continued to identify the two critical problems that faced China as 
its "apparent inability ... to develop [its) vast internal resources 
and [its inability] to resist external attack .... " 11 These were the 
same problems that had prompted his reform petition three years 
earlier. By 1897, he had become convinced that the universal and 
systematic corruption that attended the rule of the Manchu dynasty 
was primarily responsible for China's developmental incapacities 
and defensive weaknesses. He called, as a consequence, for the over-
throw of the "foreign monarchy" and the introduction of some 
"form of representative government. ... " 12 
By 1897, therefore, Sun had already given first expression to the 
three themes that were to give substance to his ideology: he advo-
cated a rededication of Chinese nationalism, the establishment of 
representative government, and his own form of developmental so-
cialism. At thirty, Sun had put together the outlines of his political 
program. At its center was the min-sheng, his doctrine of Chinese 
socialism. 
That Sun Yat-sen identified his developmental doctrine with a 
broadly conceived socialism as early as 1896 or 1897 is now reason-
ably well-established. 13 There is evidence, for example, that Sun 
was aware of the discussions of Western socialism that had begun to 
appear in Chinese publications as early as 1890. But the socialism 
that was the object of Chinese interest had very little to do with any-
thing that might pass as Marxist "orthodoxy." Most of the material 
that appeared in China at that time concerned itself with the alterna-
tive socialisms that were enormously popular in the West at the end 
of the nineteenth century. In 1891, for example, the influential Re-
view of the Times-published by Christian missionaries-provided a 
serial translation of Edward Bellamy's nationalist and socialist 
novel, Looking Backward-a novel that heralded a future world 
without international strife, capitalist cupidity, or imperialist oppres-
II. Sun, "China's Present and Future: The Reform Party's Plea for British Benevo-
lent Neutrality," in Kuo-fu ch'iian-chi, 5, 81. 
12. Sun, "Kidnapped in London," ibid., p. II. 
13. Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (Berke-
ley: University of California, 1968), pp. 116-117. 
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sion. The future, for Bellamy, would be one characterized by an ad-
vanced collectivistic industrial system that would provide 
abundantly, and equitably, for all. 14 
We know that Sun was familiar with the Review of the Times 
from about 1889 onwards, and probably read the serialization of 
Bellamy's "national socialist" novel in its pages. Bellamy's book was 
enormously popular in the West during the last decade of the nine-
teenth century, and provided a fictional account of a technologically 
and industrially sophisticated world, animated by humanity and jus-
tice, that would succeed the world of class struggle, poverty, interna-
tional war and aggression, with which the men of his time were 
afflicted. 
Many Chinese intellectuals of the period saw in Bellamy's social 
criticism a reflection of the moral and social concerns of traditional 
Confucianism. By the time of the appearance of Bellamy's book, a 
number of Chinese scholars had undertaken to give Confucianism a 
more modern reference. K'ang Yu-wei, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who 
were to serve as the nation's principal intellectual leaders during the 
reform period before the end of the century, had put together an 
interpretation of Confucianism that conceived the reflections of the 
Chinese sage a guide to the future, rather than a simple historical 
record of traditional ethical injunctions. 
K'ang Yu-wei had earlier undertaken a "higher criticism" of the 
traditional Confucian texts, and by 1884 and 1885 had composed the 
first draft of a manuscript called Ta-t'ung shu-an account of a fu-
ture world animated by Confucian virtues. After the appearance of 
Bellamy's book in Chinese translation, K'ang's conceptions of that 
future Confucian world began to take on more and more of the fea-
tures of a universal society made abundant by advanced industrial 
technology, and rendered humane by the influence of traditional 
Chinese social and political virtues. K'ang's ideas began to take on 
more and more of the appearance of the kind of socialism to be 
found in books like those written by Edward Bellamy and Henry 
George. In the final version of his Ta-t'ung shu, K'ang's views could 
only be described as a form of non-Marxist, Chinese socialism. 15 It 
14. Li Yu-ning, The Introduction of Socialism into China (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity, 1971), p. 3; the serialization of Bellamy's book appeared in The Review of the 
Times, issues 35 through 49, December 1891 through April 1892. 
15. See K'ang Yu-wei, Ta-t'ung Shu (translated by Laurence G. Thompson. 
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958); Hsiao Kung-chuan, "In and Out of Utopia: 
K'ang Yu-wei's Social Thought, II. Road to Utopia," Chung Chi Journal, 7, 2 (May 
1968). 
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is clear that Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had given K'ang's ideas considerable 
circulation during the period when Sun was closest to the major gen-
try reformers of Imperial China. 
The socialism that attracted Sun was precisely that kind of so-
cialism current in the China of his day. It was a socialism predicated 
on technological and industrial advance-a developmental social-
ism-that shared complex affinities with the intellectual and moral 
traditions of China. It was a socialism that sought the renovation, 
rehabilitation and international security of the nation. It was an ev-
olutionary, developmental socialism predicated as much on selected 
traditional, as Western, ideas. The Chinese components, in all 
probability, derived from K'ang, and their influence resurfaced regu-
larly in Sun's subsequent thought. 
K'ang, like most of the advanced Chinese thinkers of his time, 
conceived the world progressing through evolutionary stages. For 
K'ang those stages involved the transition from an Age of Disorder 
(chu-!uan shih), through an Age of Approaching Peace (sheng-p'ing 
shih), to an ultimate Age of Universal Peace (t'ai-p'ing shih), or 
Great Harmony (ta-t'ung). K'ang understood each age as having a 
particular political form and as suffering particular attendant 
hazards. He saw the age in which he lived as one of transition be-
tween the rule of absolute, to that of rule by constitutional, 
monarchs. It was an age of "small peace" (hsiao-k'ang) in which 
efforts would be made to establish constitutional rule, and in which 
nations would contend with nations. Only at the conclusion of the 
age then emerging, the Age of Approaching Peace, could the world 
expect the final Great Harmony-that age of perfect humanity and 
an equitable social order. 16 It would be an age of democracy and 
international peace, that cherished the sanctity of labor and provided 
for public welfare through the social ownership of property. 17 
These were the ideas with which Sun was most probably famil-
iar when he identified himself with the broad current of socialism in 
1897. It was a form of socialism composed of traditional Chinese 
ethical principles, animated by a preoccupation with the hazards and 
potentials ofthe Age of Approaching Peace. 18 Like K'ang and many 
16. See Hao Chang, Liang Ch'l~ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907 
(Cambridge: Harvard, 1971), Chap. 2. 
17. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,lntel/ectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period (translated by Imman-
uel C.Y. Hsi1. Cambridge: Harvard, 1959), p. 96. 
18. For the modified Confucian elements to be found in Sun's political ideology, see 
A. James Gregor, "Confucianism and the Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen," Philosophy 
East and West, 31, I (January 1981), 55-70. 
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of his contemporaries, both Chinese and Western, Sun conceived the 
world involved in a protracted evolutionary, and progressive, his-
toric process, and for him, as it would for K'ang, the process would 
conclude with the realization of the goals of the "min-sheng princi-
ple"which Sun identified with "Confucius' hope of a 'great 
commonwealth'." 19 
Until that time of fulfillment, however, mankind would remain 
embroiled in the "age of little peace." For Sun the three principal 
economic problems that tormented that age were those that required 
a comprehensive land policy, an effective developmental program, 
and a strategy to deal with the multiple threats mounted by foreign 
imperialism. By 1897, Sun had already settled on the elements of 
those policies. In his pursuit of solutions, he had probably already 
become familiar with the work of Henry George. The Review of the 
Times, in December 1894, had devoted its pages to a discussion of 
"land nationalization" and the "single tax," themes that George had 
made popular in his Progress and Poverty, a book that first appeared 
in a regular American edition in 1880. While in Japan in 1897, Sun 
returned to George's work and read it in its entirety for the first 
time.20 
In Progress and Poverty, George argued that the privation that 
affiicted the population of China, as well as its lack of economic pro-
gress, could be directly attributed to the fact that throughout the n·a-
tion "insecurity prevails, production goes on under the greatest 
disadvantages, and exchange is closely fettered. Where the govern-
ment," George went on, "is a succession of squeezings, and security 
for capital of any sort must be purchased of a mandarin, [millions 
will find themselves] ... just on the verge of starvation."21 It was 
not excess population, nor the dearth of arable land, that produced 
the calamitous and retrograde conditions of China, but a constella-
tion of political and social constraints on indigenous production and 
distribution. George went on to address himself to the problem of 
oppressive rack-rents that agrarian tenants were compelled to pay in 
various parts of the world-rents that served as grievous disincen-
tives to agricultural development and efficiency.22 
In his essay on "China's Present and Future," published in 
19. Sun, San-min chu-i (Taipei: China Publishing, n.d.), p. 184. 
20. See Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1954 ). 
21. Henry George, Progress and Poverty (New York: Schalkenbach, 1953), pp. 121-
22. 
22. Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
12 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
1897,23 Sun expanded upon just these assessments. China's agrarian 
problems were not the consequence of overpopulation or the insuffi-
ciency of arable land. The fact that foodstuffs could not be trans-
ported from areas of agricultural abundance to those suffering 
harvest failures without passing through an inordinate number of 
local impost stations, for example, caused local famine and de-
creased the disposition of farmers in fertile areas to expand produc-
tivity. Vast areas remained fallow as a consequence. Foreigners had 
further complicated China's agrarian problems by imposing "free 
trade" requirements on the nation-allowing foodstuffs to enter 
China without paying import duties, thereby underselling local 
products to the detriment of local production. The consequence was 
not only the decline of agricultural productivity, and the abandon-
ment of marginal, but arable land, but the dearth of indigenously 
generated investment capital as well. 
In his discussion with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Chang Ping-lin in 
1899, Sun elaborated on his concerns. Chinese agriculture had re-
mained inadequate to the needs of the nation, and as a support base 
for economic development, not only because of the corruption of 
mandarin officials, impaired transportation facilities, and competi-
tion with "imperialist" trade, but because tenant farmers were com-
pelled to pay "half of what they produce to the landlords." A more 
equitable arrangement in Sun's judgment, would render the peasants 
prosperous and release capital for self-sustaining national develop-
ment. The best solution, he argued at that time, would be that "all 
who can till should receive land."24 
After 1903, and particularly after the founding of the T'ung-
meng hui in the summer of 1905, Sun's land policies became the fo-
cus of critical attention. In their oath to the revolution, Sun's follow-
ers swore to uphold what were ultimately to become the critical 
components of the "three principles of the people": the national re-
vival of China, the establishment of political democracy, and what 
was then called "the equalization of land rights."25 
23. Sun, "China's Present and Future," Kuoju ch'uan-chi, 5, 81-109. 
24. As reported in Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "She-hui ko-ming kuo wei chin-jih Chung-kuo 
so pi-yao hu," Hsin-min ts'ung-pao, 86 (December 1906), 32; see Schiffrin, Sun Yat-
sen . .. , pp. 308-309. 
25. Hu Han-min, "Min pao chih liu ta chu-i" [The Six Great Principles of the Min-
pao], Min pao, 3 (April 5, 1906), pp. 1-22. The entire collection of the Min-pao, pub-
lished between 1905 and 1908 has been republished as Min-pao (Peking: K'o-hsueh 
ch'u-pan-she ying-yin, 1957). See also Sun Tzu-ho, "The Political Programs of the 
T'ung-meng hui," China Forum, 5, I (January 1978), 107-108. 
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The equalization of land rights as Sun and his followers under-
stood it was essentially a gradual application of Henry George's no-
tions concerning a tax on all "unearned increment" that would 
accrue to land as a consequence of social progress. "Equalization of 
land rights," as an expression, had appeared in the oath of a branch 
of Sun's earlier revolutionary organization, the Hsing-chung hui, in 
Hanoi in 1902. The same expression figured in the oath of the Revo-
lutionary Military Academy that Sun founded in Japan in 1903, and 
once again in the oath that attended the reorganization of one of 
Sun's groups in San Francisco in 1904. What the expression meant 
to Sun and his followers became reasonably clear in the exchanges 
that followed between the authors of Sun's Min-pao and those of the 
constitutional monarchists collected around the Hsin-min ts'ung-pao 
of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (by then intransigently opposed to popular 
revolution against the Manchu monarchy). 
In Aprill906 and March 1907, Hu Han-min, one of the princi-
pal spokesmen for Sun's T'ung-meng hui, provided an exposition of 
the concept of "equalization of land rights."26 By equalization of 
land rights Sun and his followers meant governmental appropriation 
of "unearned increments" in value rather than the formal abrogation 
of private land holdings. After the revolution they anticipated, the 
government would impose a tax on any increments in land value, 
other than capital improvements, that would subsequently take 
place. Such increments in value, they argued, would be the conse-
quence of collective social progress, and would be returned to the 
collectivity to fuel the ongoing process of industrialization.27 The 
policy of equalization of land rights, in and of itself, was not a pro-
gram of land redistribution. Sun's collaborators conceived of it as 
one way to transfer capital from the traditional to the modem sectors 
of the economy.28 Governmental acquisition of "unearned incre-
ment" due to the rise in land values that followed the anticipated 
26. Hu, "Min pao chih liu ta chu-i," and "Kao fei-nan min-sMng chu-i che" (To the 
Detractors of the Ming-sheng chu-i], Min-pao, 12 (March 6, 1907). 
27. See Robert Sca1apino and Harold Z. Schiffrin, "Early Socialist Currents in the 
Chinese Revolutionary Movement," Journal of Asian Studies, (May, 1959), p. 332. 
28. Hu, "Min pao chih liu ta chu-i," p. 13. Years later, Sun expressed the same 
conviction in the following manner: "When land rights have been equalized, capitalists 
will be disposed to abandon land speculation and invest in machine enterprise [chi:Yeh] 
thus engaging in industry and commerce. Economic development could be the only 
consequence, since land is limited, while the profits from industry and commerce are 
potentially limitless .... " Sun, "Min-sMng chu-i chih shih-shih" [The Enactment of 
the Principle of People's Livelihood], speech of May 4, 1912, in Kuo-fu ch'Uan-chi, 2, 232. 
See also Schiffrin, "Sun Yat-sen's Early Land Policy." 
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advent of industrialization and the expansion of communication and 
transportation systems, rather than accruing to private individuals, 
would provide the capital for the self-sustaining growth of the na-
tional economy. Such a strategy of social reform would preclude the 
concentration of wealth characteristic of the West-while freeing in-
ert capital, otherwise locked into land speculation, for employment 
in the more dynamic developmental sectors. 
Irrespective of the specific interpretation advanced by Hu with 
regard to the equalization of land rights, it was clear that the ideo-
logues that had collected around the Min-pao also entertained some 
of the same convictions concerning land policy that Sun had articu-
lated as early as 1899. Hu, for example, recognized that agricultural 
tenant labor in China was "oppressed and impoverished" (k'un) by 
the land-holding "capitalists." Moreover, because farm laborers 
were unable to own the lands they tilled, they produced profits that 
accrued exclusively to the landlords--capital that was thus denied 
the nation. Only by institutionalizing greater equity in the country-
side could the "dictatorship of the landlords" be offset, and the prof-
its produced in the agrarian sector applied to the "benefit of the 
nation's economy." What would result from the application of such 
policies would be a "national socialism" (kuo-yu chu-i). 29 In effect, 
"equalization of land rights" may have, in and of itself, referred only 
to the collective acquisition of unearned increments on land, but the 
ideologues of the T'ung-meng hui also anticipated much more in 
terms of alternative arrangements in property relations in the agra-
rian sector-one that would allow not only greater equity, but, at 
least potentially, land to the tillers as well-all in the service of in-
creasing intersectoral capital flows from the agricultural, to the mod-
em industrial, sector. 
Furthermore, for the ideologues of the Min-pao, while the 
equalization of land rights constituted the main principle of the min-
sheng chu-i, it did not exhaust its substance. When Feng Tzu-yu 
addressed these issues, he identified the political and economic prin-
ciples of the T'ung-meng hui with "socialism" or "state socialism" 
(kuo-chia min-sheng chu-i)--a program he likened to that of the Ger-
man government under Bismarck and to that of the post-Meiji Ref-
ormation government of Japan. Such programs were better 
29. Hu, "Min pao chih liu ta chu-i," p. 13. Sun continued to refer to his political 
ideal as a "national socialism." He maintained that " ... the principle of people's liveli-
hood is the principle of national socialism." Sun, "T'i-ch'ang min-sheng chu-i chih chen-
i" [Promote the True Meaning of the Principle of the People's Livelihood], Kuofo 
ch 'lian-ch~ 2, 22. 
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characterized by the interventions of a tutelary state in the national 
economy than any preoccupation with state acquisition of unearned 
increment of land. Such a socialism involved government monopo-
lies of public utilities and special sectors of the economy, 30 a general 
concern with industrial growth, and the provision of innovative so-
cial welfare programs. 
Thus, by 1906, Sun and his theoreticians had put together an 
ideology of national development predicated on a system of land re-
form, proposals for the indigenous generation of capital, and a ra-
tionale for state intervention in the economy. A concern for the 
"oppressed" agrarian classes was evident, and there was more than a 
suggestion that Sun's commitment to a program of "land to the til-
lers" had influenced his followers. These latter concerns were 
muted, for considerable support was expected from land-holding 
segments of the population. The T'ung meng hui was attempting to 
recruit rather than alienate support. But those concerns remained in 
evidence nonetheless. They were to continue to influence the ideo-
logical development of the revolutionaries that collected around Sun 
until the belief system of the Kuomintang was fully articulated two 
decades later. 
Thus, while all of Sun's followers were effusive in the defense of 
the notion of a land tax on unearned increment, they clearly did not 
imagine that such a tax exhausted either the revolutionary program 
of the T'ung-meng hui or its land policies. Sun's program was a com-
plex collection of land and developmental policies clearly designed 
to provide China, as a developing national community, with at least 
part of the capital resources that would permit it to rapidly outstrip 
the West in terms of industrialization, economic development, and 
defense capabilities.3 1 
Beyond that, there was an awareness that indigenously gener-
ated capital could hardly fully satisfy the capital demands of a devel-
oping China. In March 1907, Hu Han-min insisted that while the 
future revolutionary government's appropriation of value increments 
on land would provide some of the capital "necessary for [China's] 
development," it was equally evident that the capital resources of the 
nation would be inadequate to the task of providing sufficient fund-
ing to underwrite the complex process of self-sustaining growth. As 
a consequence, Hu recommended that China welcome foreign in-
30. Feng Tzu-yu, "Lu Chung-kuo Jih-pao min-sMng chu-i hu chung-kuo cheng-chih 
ko-ming chih ch'ien-t'u" (A revised 'Min-sheng chu-i and the Future of China's Political 
Revolution'], Min-pao, 4 (May 1, 1906), p. 13. 
31. Ibid. 
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vestment to supplement its deficient capital resources. The United 
States and Australia, he argued, had pursued such a policy, and as a 
consequence, had acceded to the status of capital exporting countries 
themselves. Hu anticipated a similar consequence for China just 
commencing its economic take-off. Hu, in effect, refused to conceive 
involvement in international trade and investment as competitive. 
In commerce and investment it was not necessary for either partici-
pant to win at the expense of the other. Foreign investment would 
return profits to investors that might well be repatriated, but invest-
ment generated wages and development, and left a concrete legacy 
in fixed assets in the host country.32 For the intellectuals of the 
T'ung-meng hui, China's rapid modernization depended on the 
availability of autonomously generated investment capital through a 
scheme of tax on "unearned increments," intersectoral capital trans-
fers, and access to the surplus capital markets provided by the ad-
vanced industrial countries. · 
During this entire period, Sun remained concerned with the 
threat of foreign oppression as well as China's significant lack of eco-
nomic modernization and industrial development.33 Like his collab-
orators on the staff of Min-pao, Sun was prepared to acknowledge 
the threats posed by imperialism-just as he had recognized those 
threats in his reform letter to Li Hung-chang in 1894, and just as he 
had done in his support of Filipino revolutionaries in their resistance 
to American control of their homeland in 1898.34 His preoccupation 
with the threat of imperialism was, and remained, constant. But he 
was equally prepared to recognize that China's modernization and 
industrialization required the support of foreign capital. As a conse-
quence, he made a clear distinction between the objectionable polit-
ical and military forms of imperialism and the potentially positive 
effects of international commerce and investment. 
Sun, like the men around him, was cognizant of the prevailing 
theories of imperialism that had been made popular by the tum of 
the century. In his "The True Solution of the Chinese Question," 
written in 1904 for an English reading public, he specifically alluded 
to theses that had been broadcast in 1902 by J.A. Hobson in his Im-
perialism. He spoke of the concern bruited by some Europeans that 
the flow of capital and technology from the more advanced countries 
might make "a sort of Frankenstein" out of China. To counter such 
32. Hu, "Kao fei-nan," pp. 70, 75, 80. 
33. Sun, "The True Solution of the Chinese Question," in Kuoju ch '/ian-chi, 5, pp. 
111-119, 121. 
34. Jansen, op. cit, pp. 68-74. 
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a suggestion, he argued that the economic development and modern-
ization of China, under appropriate conditions, would increase the 
sum of international benefits rather than threaten the welfare of any 
of the participants in the process. 
For Sun, it was only when the inflow of foreign capital and the 
introduction of trade and commerce were attended by military and 
political interference that international economic relations took on 
the characteristics of a zero-sum game in which the absolute benefits 
to one of the participants fell below what could realistically be ob-
tained if those relations were alternatively organized. In such a situ-
ation the "exploitation loss" of one participant would constitute the 
"exploitation gain" of the other. But such relationships could only 
be maintained if the one participant was politically and militarily so 
deficient that the maintenance costs of the relationship would not 
offset any exploitation gains made by the privileged participant. If 
the maintenance costs could be made prohibitive, on the other hand, 
the relationship between participants would be transformed into a 
"nonzero-sum," or "general" game, in which all participants could 
be expected, realistically, to gain. 
Throughout his life, Sun continued to maintain that interna-
tional economic relations were not intrinsically exploitative. He ar-
gued that in his age of "little peace," international actors would be 
expected to attempt to maximize their advantages. Where any one 
participant was demonstrably weak, others could be expected to ex-
ploit the opportunity to increase their gains. In any number of 
places Sun provided a doleful recitation of the economic exploitation 
of Asians at the hands of powerful Western powers. The British in 
India, and the French in Indo-China, had wrung enormous benefits 
from their defenseless dependencies. As long as nations are "strong 
enough to carry out acts of injustice" at minimal costs, he argued, 
one could hardly expect "respect for justice."35 As a consequence 
Sun gave priority to the development of China's defensive capabili-
ties, in order to create an environment in which there would be no 
opportunity for exploitation gains without corresponding mainte-
nance costs. The only way in which China could escape the conse-
quences of imperialism was to increase its costs. A strong and united 
China would make the costs of maintaining an exploitative relation-
ship too expensive for any foreign power. If China could mount ef-
35. Sun, The Vital Problem of China (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), pp. 8-
10. This collection while attributed to Sun was probably compiled by Chu chih-hsin. It 
does, however, represent Sun's views. See Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot, pp. 
92, 387. 
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fective resistance, relationships of trade and investment could be 
conducted on the basis of equality. Without the advantages afforded 
by extra-territoriality and unequal treaties, foreign commerce and 
investment could be made to serve China's economic modernization 
and industrialization. 
If China could accede to a position of strength-with a popula-
tion united in the defense of the nation-its economic relations with 
foreign powers could be made to serve its own, as well as foreign, 
interests. Without that capacity China would succumb to the domi-
nance of foreign interests and might well remain forever in a "state 
of serfdom, so that a profitable trade [could] be carried on forever by 
the ruling country and ... [China would] always be a market for 
[their] industrial products."36 Under prevailing international condi-
tions each nation pursues its own immediate interests. As long as 
China remained defenseless, foreign economic exploitation would be 
the consequence of foreign political and military hegemony. In ef-
fect Sun entertained a political conception of exploitative imperial-
ism. He clearly understood that "of the ... forces [that determine a 
nation's future] the most potent are political forces and economic 
forces," and while economic oppression was more severe than polit-
ical oppression, the former could not be sustained without the preva-
lence of the latter. For Sun, "imperialism" was the "policy of 
aggression upon other countries by means of political force. . .. " In 
the pursuit of security and advantage the "strong states" impose 
their will on "smaller and weaker peoples. . . :m Without effective 
political and military control of subject peoples, exploitative rela-
tions could not be maintained. 
In a clear and determinate sense, Sun entertained a modem no-
tion of imperialism, sufficiently different not only from contempo-
rary dependency theorists, but from that of the early Marxists, to 
merit independent characterization. He laid major emphasis on 
politics, power, national security, and national prestige in his expla-
nation of imperialist behavior in the nineteenth and the beginning of 
the twentieth century. In his judgment, the exploitation advantage 
enjoyed by dominant nations was the consequence of political and 
military power, and not the result of some inherent necessities of the 
commercial or financial dynamics of capitalism.38 Exploitative eco-
nomic imperialism was, in Sun's judgment, the perfectly rational 
36. Ibid., p. 96. 
37. Sun, San-min chu-i, pp. 8, 10, 21, 23. Emphasis supplied. 
38. In this regard, see Hsu Yu-chu, "The Regulation of Private Capital and Equali-
zation of Wealth and Income," China Forum, J, 2 (July 1976), p. 69; and the discussion in 
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strategy of foreign policy in a competitive world, in situations of pre-
dominant political and military advantage. If China was to develop, 
it would have to depend on expertise, technological and capital 
transfers from the advanced industrial powers. But if it was not to 
succumb to exploitation as a consequence, China was required to 
attempt to politically ally itself with those powers with which it 
shared international and strategic interests, in order to offset their 
disposition to exploit.39 In the contemporary organization of the in-
ternational system of national states, nations succumb to the tempta-
tions of exploitation in the effort to maximize their individual power 
positions-all things being equal. Only by making the costs of main-
taining a system of exploitation costly to potential imperialists, in 
terms of their international prestige, security, or position, could less 
developed states escape disadvantage. Only "when a nation has an 
unconquerable spirit of independence [will] other nations think it 
advisable to show respect for its independence."40 Under such cir-
cumstances dependency relations are transformed into relations of 
interdependency and the zero-sum relationship is translated into one 
of mutual advantage. "If China stood on an equal political basis 
with other nations," Sun maintained, she could not only "compete 
freely with them in the economic field and be able to hold her own 
without failure,"41 she would have nothing to fear from economic 
exploitation. In such circumstances, China could "open up her mar-
kets for the benefit" of international commerce, and welcome "for-
eign capital to develop . . . industry . . . communication and 
transportation facilities, and foreign brains and experience to man-
age them."42 
It was clear that Sun conceived industrial civilization driven by 
the necessities of capitalist production to seek market and investment 
outlets in the less developed countries. Like the first Marxists, he 
understood such circumstances as offering, at the same time, the op-
portunity of development and modernization for those nations that 
remained economically backward. The critical variable that deter-
mined the outcome would be, in essence, political. An industrially 
Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 
231-245. 
39. Sun, The Vital Problem of China, pp. 124-125. 
40. Ibid., pp. 126, 128-129. 
41. Sun, San-min chu-i, p. 208. 
42. Sun, The Vital Problem of China, p. 135, San-min chu-i, pp. 182-183, and "The 
Chinese Republic," The Independent (New York), September 9, 1912, reproduced in 
China Forum, 4, 2 (July 1977), pp. 341-342. 
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and economically retarded nation could profit from its commercial 
and economic relationship with those more advanced, if and only if, 
it enjoyed some measure of political equality, or could offer potential 
allies some strategic advantage, that could purchase it equity. Under 
such conditions international commerce and foreign investment 
could rebound to the mutual advantage of all parties. 
Such was the assessment of imperialism to which Sun commit-
ted himself throughout his life. Unlike dependency theorists, Sun 
saw no inevitability of "underdevelopment" for China as a conse-
quence of involvement in the international market economy. In his 
earliest writings Sun assiduously sought commercial connections, in-
vestment and technology transfers, and the assistance of foreign ex-
perts.43 In 1904, in anticipation of China's development, he spoke of 
his nation as providing "a grand field hitherto never dreamed of . . . 
to the social and economic activities of the civilized world."44 In 
1918-1919, when Sun addressed himself to a program for the devel-
opment of China, he spoke of welcoming foreign trade and capital as 
long as that development could be organized in such a manner as to 
"ensure the mutual benefit of China and of the countries cooperating 
with us." He saw China's development proceeding in a manner that 
would ensure the well-being of its citizens, its political integrity, and 
its international sovereignty, as well as the provision of a "new mar-
ket . . . big enough for her own products and for products from for-
eign countries .... The nations," he went on, ''which will take part 
in this development will reap immense advantages .... In [such 
an] undertaking, foreign capital must be invited, foreign experts and 
organizers have to be enlisted, and gigantic methods have to be 
adopted. . . .During the construction and the operation of each of 
these national undertakings, before its capital and interest are fully 
repaid, it will be managed and supervised by foreign experts under 
Chinese employment. As one of their obligations, these foreign ex-
perts have to undertake the training of Chinese assistants to take 
their place in the future."45 
In effect, Sun conceived international relations determined not 
by some necessities inherent in modem capitalism, but the conse-
quence of calculation on the part of sovereign powers, each attempt-
ing to maximize its own benefits. Those benefits were not only 
economic, but involved strategic political and military, as well as in-
43. Sun, "China's Present and Future," Kuo-:fu ch'Uan-chi, 5, pp. 82, 108-109. 
44. Sun, "The True Solution," ibid., 5, p. 121. 
45. Sun, The lntemational Development of China, ibid., 5, pp. 129, 130, 132, 135. 
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fluential moral, concerns as well. Sun never conceived the foreign 
policy of the advanced nations to be simply the products of the 
machinations of "finance capitalists." For Sun, foreign policy be-
haviors were a function of a number of intersecting interests: a con-
cern for the balance of power in one or another region of the globe; 
an attempt to enhance international prestige and ensure security; a 
search for necessary raw materials, market supplements, or invest-
ment outlets; and, finally, the influence of a cultural tradition com-
mitted to justice and altruism, or to one that is exploitative and self-
serving. 
A disadvantaged nation like Sun's China would have to put to-
gether a balanced strategy that would allow it to survive and prosper 
in such a competitive and hazardous environment. China would 
have to advance a set of proposals that would serve its own self inter-
est, but which would at the same time provide strategic and eco-
nomic advantage to one or another, or some collection of, advanced 
powers, in order to negotiate the transition from its position of de-
pendency to that of a strong and independent, sovereign power. 
Much of this had been implicit, and some of it had been ex-
plicit, from the time of Sun's early maturity. By the time he deliv-
ered his lectures on the San-min chu-i in 1924, he had put all this 
together with a land policy and a program of industrialization that 
together made up as coherent and consistent an economic program 
as provided by any revolutionary in the twentieth century. 
Central to his program was the conviction that the motive force 
of history was the search for, and the maintenance and enhancement 
of, the means of existence necessary to sustain the livelihood of peo-
ples.46 In order to ensure the maintenance and foster the growth of 
their means of livelihood, each community seeks to harmonize its 
internal parochial and conflicting interests. In our own time, that 
harmony is sought through social legislation, increasing community 
control over the means of production, direct taxation to more equita-
bly redistribute society's.wealth, and the introduction of cooperative 
and governmental agencies to more effectively distribute commodi-
ties. When producers and workers collaborate in such policies the 
reconciliation of interests ensures social and productive progress that 
profits all. "Society progresses," Sun maintained, "through the ad-
justment of major economic interests [rather) than through the clash 
of interests. [When] the economic interests of society can be harmo-
46. Sun, San-min chu-i, pp. 155-156. 
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nized, the majority of people will benefit and society will progress."47 
All men-capitalists, artisans, merchants, landowners, financiers, in-
dustrial, and agrarian, workers alike-contribute to that collective 
enterprise designed to sustain and enhance the livelihood of citizens. 
As a consequence Sun rejected the Marxian conception of class war-
fare as the motive force of historical change. The episodes of social 
strife and class conflict to which Marx alluded, in Sun's judgment, 
were instances of "social pathology," rather than evidences of the 
endemic traits of any social system. Class warfare was evidence of a 
"diseased" social order. Only a community that cannot provide ade-
quately for its members is one in which the functionally and organi-
cally related components lapse into conflict. 
In order to preclude the onset of such disorder, a rational com-
munity of men will provide for the well-being of all its members. 
China, long tormented by the systematic corruption of Manchu rule, 
and the impostures of foreign powers was, in Sun's judgment, 
threatened with the onset of that kind of pathological disharmony so 
graphically portrayed in the socialist works prevalent in the West. 
To prevent the advent of such a process, China required an eco-
nomic program that would provide for the immediate, and enhance 
the future, well-being of all its citizens. 
For Sun, such a program involved "equalization of landowner-
ship" and the "regulation of capital." Both were implicit, and often 
explicit, as early as the exchanges in the Min-pao of 1906.48 In 1924 
"equalization of landownership" was advanced as precaution 
against speculation in land, the nonproductive dissipation of scarce 
capital, and the development of conditions that might foster fratrici-
dal class warfare. What Sun proposed was a clear determination of 
the value of land before the rapid development of industry and com-
merce could inflate it, producing all the disabilities he anticipated. 
Once the value of land was fixed, all "unearned increments," incre-
ments in value that were not the direct result of capital improve-
ments by the landowner himself, would be taxed. Ownership would 
remain with the current owner, but the government would reserve 
the right of purchase at the fixed value in order to serve the public 
interest.49 Beyond that, Sun advocated the introduction of govern-
47. Ibid., pp. 160-161. 
48. Government control of public utilities and monopolies was advocated by both 
Hu Man-min in his "Kao fei-nan," and Feng Tzu-yu in his "Lu Chung-kuo Jih-pao min-
sheng chu-i," p. 109. Sun collaborated with both authors during this period, and there is 
little doubt that such views would not have appeared had Sun objected to them. 
49. Sun, San-min chu-i, pp. 178-179. 
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ment regulations designed to protect the peasantry and increase their 
productivity. He spoke of the oppressive rents that depressed the 
yield of the working peasantry. He spoke of rents that approximated 
those of rack-rents and advocated relief. Finally, Sun spoke of pro-
viding "land to the tillers." 
Sun had alluded to both the notion of rent reduction and that of 
providing land to those who actually tilled it as early as 1899. In 
1912, he reiterated, "China is an agricultural country. Without solv-
ing the basic problems of the peasants, no thorough reforms can be 
possible. In order to solve the agrarian problem, farmers must own 
their own lands."50 In the interim, the discussions in the Min-pao 
had been given currency. Finally, in 1924, Sun spelled out his entire 
agrarian program. The Kuomintang, in his judgment, was com-
pelled by circumstance and simple justice to mobilize peasant sup-
port for the revolution. In order to accomplish that, the revolution 
must appeal to the self-interest of the agrarian working masses. But 
more than that, a policy of rent reduction and land to the tillers 
would not only stimulate farm production but would allow critically 
important revenues, hitherto collected by landlords, to accrue to the 
state (kung-chia }-a state that would be responsible for implement-
ing a comprehensive agricultural program of scientific agronomy, in-
frastructural development, water conservancy and rural irrigation.51 
It is perfectly obvious that as a political leader, Sun was often 
circumspect in addressing his audiences. He did not always, and 
everywhere, give equal emphasis to every aspect of his land policy. 
But there is equally little doubt that Sun entertained a collection of 
programmatic ideas concerning a revolutionary land policy for 
China that included not only a tax on the unearned increment of 
land, but significant rent relief through legislation, and a correlative 
but independent policy of providing land to tenant farmers. As ad-
juncts to those programmatic ideas, Sun advocated extensive and in-
tensive development of agriculture, not only drawing marginal and 
uncultivated land into production, but increasing yield through the 
employment of machinery, chemical fertilizers, scientific crop rota-
tion, pest control, more effective irrigation, water conservancy meas-
ures, and flood control. All of which entailed the collateral 
development of appropriate educational facilities, machine produc-
50. As cited, Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Using and the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: 
Stanford University, 1961), p. 141. 
51. Sun, "Keng-che yao-yu ch'i-t'ien" (Land to. the Tillers), Kuo-.fu ch'iian-chi, 2, pp. 
719-723, San-min chu-i, pp. 187-200. 
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tion, hydro- and thermoelectric power generation, and a mass-com-
munications and transportation infrastructure. 
Such an ambitious program of development required the inter-
vention of the state through coordinating and control agencies that 
had all the attributes of the "state socialism" to which the intellectu-
als of the T'ung-meng hui had alluded as early as 1906. Under the 
revolutionary dispensation, the "industrial development of China 
[would] be carried out along two lines: (1) by private enterprise and 
(2) by national undertaking. All matters that can be and are better 
carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands 
which would be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws. . . . 
All matters that cannot be taken up by private concerns and those 
that possess monopolistic character should be taken up as national 
undertakings. . . . The property thus created [would] be state-
owned and [would] be managed for the benefit of the whole 
nation."52 
These policies governing the process of industrialization consti-
tuted the substance of "the control of capital." Private enterprise 
was to operate freely within the expanding economy, but critical sec-
tors of the economy and major undertakings, requiring all the ad-
vantages of scale, were to be conducted by the planning and control 
agencies of the state. 53 The state, furthermore, would assume tutelary 
obligation to insure a system of distribution that would minimally 
provide adequacy-and gradually, a substantial equality of welfare 
for all. Such a system would displace profit as the single object of 
enterprise, and "make nurture of the people its aim." Ultimately, 
the capitalist system of commodity production would be entirely dis-
placed. 54 "In a nutshell," Sun was to insist, "it is my idea to make 
capitalism create socialism in China so that these two economic 
forces of human evolution will work side by side in future 
civilization."55 
These complex programs of economic development and mod-
ernization would require substantial capital, and technological, 
transfers from the more advanced nations. Such transactions would 
have to be undertaken under circumstances of equity and mutual 
respect. To insure such an eventuality, China must have the military 
power to deter threat, and the sovereign right to abrogate unequal 
52. Sun, The International Development of China, p. 135. 
53. Sun, "History of the Chinese Revolution," Fundamentals, p. 82. 
54. Sun, San-min chu-i, pp. 198-199. 
55. Sun, The International Development of China, p. 334. 
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treaties.56 China, undertaking development, required the effective 
right to maintain a system of tariffs to protect nascent, and as yet 
non-competitive, industries. Without the abrogation of unequal 
treaties, which denied China the sovereign right to determine its own 
trade and investment policies, economic relations with the more ad-
vanced powers would work to the nation's disadvantage.57 Sun's 
continued insistence on the necessity of importing foreign capital, 
technology, and expertise,58 as we have seen, was always tempered 
by an equal insistence on China's political independence and her 
military preparedness. Only "if China stood on an equal political 
basis with other nations could she compete freely with them in the 
economic field and hold her own. But as soon as foreign nations use 
political power as a shield for their economic designs, then China is 
at a loss how to resist or to compete successfully with them."59 
For Sun Yat-sen neither the flow of capital from the advanced 
to the peripheral states, nor the involvement of the less developed 
states in bilateral or multilateral trade with those more industrial-
ized, was intrinsically exploitative. It was not something inherent in 
the nature of the international system of trade or investment that 
determined the outcome of developmental efforts on the part of eco-
nomically or industrially retarded communities. Some of the most 
critical variables influencing those outcomes had to do with the 
political and military properties of those communities themselves. 
For Sun, China's future could only be assured by the deter-
mined actions of the Chinese themselves. Armed with a set of rea-
sonably well-defined objectives, and a programmatic guide to 
modernization and development, the Chinese could achieve substan-
tial economic and industrial maturity in the space of "two or three 
decades." For Sun, the Chinese would have to provide the determi-
nation themselves. For his part, he imagined himself having deliv-
ered an ideology, and a programmatic guide to development, more 
realistic and more coherent than any other offered his contemporar-
ies. More than a generation after his death, the defeated remnants of 
56. Sun, The Vital Problem of China, pp. 6, 8-9,29-32,96, 115, 124, 136-137, 150-151, 
159, 171; cf. "The Kuomintang Declaration at Its First National Convention, January, 
1924," and "Dr. Sun's Manifesto on the Northern Expedition, September 18, 1924," in 
Leonard S. Hsu, Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals (Los Angeles: University of 
Southern California, 1932), pp. 120-141, 142-145. 
57. Sun, San-min chu-i, pp. 208-209; cf. "Statement on Establishment of the Central 
Bank of China. August 16, 1924," Foundations, p. 175. See also Yet Shang-cbih, Min-
Sheng ching-chi-nsueh [Economics of People's Livelihood] (Taipei: Lion, 1966). 
58. Sun, "How to Develop Chinese Industry," Foundations, p. 187. 
59. Sun, San-min chu-i, p. 208. 
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the revolutionary party he founded, undertook to implement his pol-
icies in what was to be "a model province" of the China Sun, him-
self, had unsuccessfully sought to unify and modernize. In 1949, the 
Kuomintang, committed to the program left by Sun Y at-sen, under-
took the economic modernization and industrial development of 
Taiwan. The three decades that followed witnessed the transforma-
tion of what had been a traditional agrarian economy into one that 
was essentially modern and industrialized. 
Now that the political and economic authorities across the Tai-
wan Strait on the Chinese Mainland have shown a disposition to 
abandon many of the orthodoxies of traditional Marxist economics 
and approach the industrialized nations of the West for capital trans-
fers and technological assistance, one can only speculate on just how 
many of Sun's ideas on economic development and modernization 
might surface in the forthcoming economic programs of a modified 
Chinese Communism. 
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CHAPTER III 
Sun Yat-sen and the Economic Development of Taiwan* 
A. James Gregor 
After the end of the second world war, events conspired to pro-
duce an environment in which Sun Yat-sen's program for economic 
development might finally be attempted, while at the same time re-
stricting that undertaking to the island of Taiwan. The retrocession 
of Taiwan to the Republic of China in 1945 and the Nationalist re-
treat to the island bastion in 1949 confined the experiment to that 
geographic space. However restricted the space in which the experi-
ment would be conducted, the enterprise on Taiwan profitted from 
some advantages any such effort would not have enjoyed on the 
Mainland. In the first place, on Taiwan the scale of the undertaking 
would be far more manageable. Equally important was the fact that 
the Nationalist government on Taiwan would not be burdened by 
the non-movement allies that had obstructed its purposes on the 
Mainland. Finally, if the Kuomintang were to retain any credibility 
after its military defeat at the hands of the forces of Mao Zedong it 
would have to realize some of its programs. The leaders of the Re-
public of China were infused by the motivation of desperation. 
On the Mainland of China, for almost two decades, the efforts 
of the Kuomintang had been absorbed in pacifying and unifying a 
nation fragmented by systemic revolution and warlordism, resisting 
interference in its internal affairs by a number of foreign powers, and 
defending the community against the armed aggression of Japan. 1 
Curiously enough, only defeat on the Mainland, and withdrawal to 
Taiwan, provided the Kuomintang with the occasion to attempt to 
implement the program of economic development left as an intellec-
tual heritage by Sun Yat-sen. 
Although the political circumstances were auspicious in at least 
these senses, economic conditions on Taiwan could hardly be less 
propitious. Until 1945 Taiwan had been an essentially agricultural 
adjunct of Japan for half a century. Between the tum of the century 
and 1945, the trade relations of the island were restricted almost ex-
clusively to bilateral exchanges with the Japanese. With retroces-
• The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, and the Pacific Cultural 
Foundation in the preparation of this paper. 
l. For a brief discussion of the circumstances of Nationalist rule on the Mainland 
during this period, see Robert E. Bedeski, State-Building in Modem China: The Kuomin-
tang in the Prewar Period (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1981 ). 
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sion, those relations were severed. Moreover, with retrocession, the 
Japanese withdrew all their governmental, administrative and tech-
nical personnel, leaving the economy of the island bereft of critical 
skills. During the second world war, almost the entire communica-
tions and transportation infrastructure had been destroyed by Allied 
bombing. The shortage of capital inputs had reduced agricultural 
yield by about fifty percent. Finally, when the Nationalists assumed 
sovereign control over the island they brought with them an awe-
some rate of inflation that further impaired the already seriously de-
fective economy. It was within such a context that the leaders of the 
Republic of China decided to embark upon a program of economic 
development for Taiwan. That program was to be guided by Sun's 
programmatic ideas. 
The economic program of Sun Yat-sen involved several fea-
tures: (1) a land policy calculated to generate capital for transfer to 
the industrializing sector while providing some measure of income 
equity and land redistribution; (2) an effort to attract foreign conces-
sional and nonconcessional aid and expertise; (3) a studied defense 
of sovereign independence and integrity in the face of external 
threat; and (4) the construction of a tutelary state equipped to super-
intend a joint public and private program of rapid economic 
development. 2 
As soon as the situation on Taiwan was stabilized in 1949, Gen-
eral Chen Cheng was chosen by Chiang Kai-shek to embark upon a 
broad policy of land reform as that reform had been prefigured in 
Sun's San-min chu-i in 1924.3 Chen had been one of Sun's "loyal-
ists" at the Whampoa Military Academy and a close confidant of 
Chiang. In his youth, he had undertaken the leadership of the Soci-
ety for the Study of Sun Yat-senism and was ideologically commit-
ted to the inherited doctrines of min-sheng-Sun's "principle of the 
people's livelihood." With the first intellectuals who had collected 
around Sun Yat-sen he had learned from Henry George that resolu-
tion of the "land question" was a prerequisite of any indigenous 
"economic progress." Taking "rent in taxation for public purposes," 
George had argued, would "further advances in productive power, 
and the tendency in this direction would be greatly acceler-
2. See Maria Hsia Chang, "Sun Yat-sen's Program for the Economic Moderniza-
tion of China," and A. James Gregor, Maria Hsia Chang and Andrew Zimmerman, 
Ideology and Development: Sun Yat-sen and the Economic History of Taiwan (Berkeley: 
Center for Chinese Studies, 1981). 
3. For a brief biographical sketch of Chen Cheng, see "Chen Cheng," in W.O. 
Goddard, The Makers of Taiwan (Taipei: China Publishing, 1963), pp. 125-143. 
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ated .... "4 Like all of Sun's followers Chen understood that any 
effort to modernize and industrialize an economy required a land 
policy that would release capital from traditional pursuits for em-
ployment in the modem sector. 
Sun had identified primary production-agriculture and min-
ing-as the "basis" of all other economic activity.5 His original land 
policy was calculated to not only provide relief for the rural popula-
tion of China, but to release capital, long immobilized in landhold-
ings, for industrial and commercial use. He anticipated not only 
increasing yields from agriculture through major land reform, but 
institutional techniques that would transfer the profits from that in-
creasing yield into the industrial growth sectors of the national econ-
omy. All of that had become so evident to the ideologues of the 
Kuomintang that in 1943, when Chiang Kaishek took it upon him-
selfto write a brief account of "Chinese Economic Theory,"6 he sim-
ply reiterated Sun's plan of economic development predicated on the 
necessary resolution of the land problem. 7 A coherent land policy 
was, in Chiang's as in Chen's judgment, the necessary condition for 
both rural stability and industrial and commercial development.8 
·Such a policy would involve systematic cadastral surveys, effec-
tive land redistribution, a program of water conservancy and an ex-
tension of irrigation facilities so essential to agricultural yield. As 
Sun had before him, Chiang spoke of the necessity of technological 
innovation and the introduction of agrobiological extension services 
to the agrarian sector to insure the employment of the most modem 
scientific methods of farm production. Like Sun, he advocated the 
development of a wide network of transport and communications 
infrastructure to service rural needs-all in the effort to improve per 
capita and total agricultural productivity.9 All of that, in tum, 
would have to be undertaken in conformity with a program that 
would provide for the interesectoral transfer of capital from the 
4. Henry George, Progress and Poverty (New York: Schalkenbach, 1953), pp. 272, 
413, 433,442; cf. p. 456. 
5. Sun, "How to Develop Chinese Industry," in Fundamentals of National Recon-
struction (Taipei: China Publishing, 1953), p. 190. 
6. It is clear that Professor Tao Hsi-sheng played a considerable role in the drafting 
of the text, but it is equally clear that the central ideas contained in the exposition were 
those of Chiang. Cf. Brian Crozier, The Man Who Lost China (New York: Scribners, 
1976). pp. 246-247. 
7. Chiang Kai-shek, "Chinese Economic Theory," in China's .Destiny (New York: 
Roy, 1947), pp. 242-245. 
8. Ibid., p. 258. 
9. Ibid., pp. 272-274. 
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agrarian, to the modernizing and industrial, sector. Under such a 
program "commercial capital [would] be invested in industry in-
stead." For Chiang, like Sun, the land policy was understood "in 
terms of agricultural-industrial, and more especially of agricultural-
commercial relations in order to achieve a real solution. The solu-
tion of the land problem [would] not only put an end to commercial 
profiteering and the enlargement of land holding, but [would] also 
facilitate the industrialization of China .... " 10 
Ideally, agricultural policy would not only create circumstances 
in which there would be net capital transfers from the traditional to 
the modem sectors of the economy, but it would enhance raw mater-
ials production necessary for industrial growth, and provide the in-
crements in per capita consumption in the rural areas that would 
constitute an expanded market for industrially generated commodi-
ties as well. 11 Native industries insulated from foreign competition 
by import tariffs, could establish themselves and lay the foundation 
for China's economic and industrial growth. 12 
These were the intellectual convictions with which Chen Cheng 
arrived in Taiwan. In his judgment the "implementation of land re-
form [was] not only basic to the betterment of the people's livelihood 
and the promotion of political social stability," but it would provide 
the "motive force for the furtherance of economic development and 
industrialization." 13 Chen assumed his responsibilities on Taiwan 
with a clear appreciation of Sun's policies concerning economic 
growth and modernization. 
One thing that ideological resolve could not supply was the for-
eign capital assistance and technological transfers that were called 
for in Sun's original program. Sun, and the intellectuals around 
him, had made the availability of international capital a critical part 
of their program. They argued that once the constraints and impos-
tures that were the products of unequal treaties were eliminated, a 
developing China could enter into bilateral and multilateral trade 
and assistance programs that would foster its modernization and 
industrialization. 
In 1949 there appeared little prospect of such relations. None-
theless, Chiang Kai-shek, fully cognizant of Sun's convictions con-
10. Ibid., p. 285. 
II. Ibid, p. 287; in this context compare John W. Mellor, The Economics of Agricul-
tural Development (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1966). 
12. Chiang, "Chinese Economic Theory," p. 279. 
13. Chen Cheng, Land Reform in Taiwan (Taipei: China Publishing, 1961), pp. xii, 
xiii. 
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cerning China's necessity to enter into economic symbiosis with one 
or another of the major powers during its transition from an under-
developed to a developed nation, anticipated that the remnants of 
the Republic of China, irrespective of the immediate circumstances 
of 1949, could expect to ally itself with the anti-communist forces of 
the Western world against the growing threat of communist military 
and political expansion. Even while the economic and financial cir-
cumstances of the Republic of China on Taiwan appeared all-but-
hopeless, 14 Chiang anticipated the possibility of an eventual reestab-
lishment of an economic and security alliance with the United States 
in what he anticipated would be the Western world's resistance 
against communism. 
It was during this critical period that the Soviet Union increas-
ingly revealed itself to the United States as a real antagonist-and 
the communist regime on the Chinese mainland, for whatever rea-
son, proceeded to align itself with Moscow. In January 1950 the 
American consular offices in Peking were seized by the forces of 
Mao Zedong. In June the Korean War commenced, and in July 
200,000 communist Chinese troops were deployed along the North 
Korean border. The immediate result of all this was an increased 
American interest in Taiwan as a strategic logistic base in the event 
of the expansion of hostilities in the Far Pacific. With the subse-
quent involvement of Chinese communist "volunteers" in the Kore-
an fighting, American interest in, and commitment to, the defense 
and security of Taiwan increased. Massive infusions of American 
military and economic aid began to flow into the Republic of China 
on Taiwan, first to bring economic, political, and social stability, and 
then to help fuel a remarkable trajectory of economic growth and 
development. Chiang had gambled on such an eventuality when he 
charged Chen Cheng with the responsibility of initiating a program 
of economic development on Taiwan. 
Thus, by the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951, all the ele-
ments of a developmental program for Taiwan had been put into 
place. Animated by the general and indicative program left as an 
intellectual legacy by Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang undertook the 
economic modernization and industrial development of Taiwan. 
The program involved sequential stages that first required a resolu-
tion of the problems that beset the countryside through a redistribu-
tion of assets and a redivision of land, a concurrent outflow of 
14. International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund, April 1969). 
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capital from the agricultural sector, while increasing yield and main-
taining, or enhancing, effective demand in the traditional sector. 
The subsequent stage would involve the creation and expansion of 
local industries via a stringent policy of import substitution and shel-
tered growth. American assistance would service both stages with 
capital concessions and loans, technology transfers, technical assist-
ance and administrative counselling. 
When American assistance manifested itself as a country aid 
program for Taiwan in the early 1950s it was received with a "com-
petence, energy, development-mindedness, and cooperative spirit" 
that distinguished its reception from that accorded by almost every 
other aid recipient. 15 That it was so received was as much a conse-
quence of long familiarity with the developmental program we now 
identify with Sun Yat-sen as it was a function of native competence 
and energy. The fact is that more than "some aspects of Sun Yat-
sen's Three People's Principles can be read into Nationalist rule" on 
Taiwan 16-the entire program was not only infused with the devel-
opmental spirit characteristic of his ideology, it embodied most of its 
critical programmatic components. 
In the early months of 1949, in anticipation of eventual Ameri-
can aid, the political authorities on Taiwan decided to commence 
with a program of economic development. The circumstances sur-
rounding their rule on Taiwan, coupled with the necessity to impart 
a sense of reality to their political and strategic goals, moved the 
Kuomintang to undertake the first phase of Sun's program for eco-
nomic growth and industrialization. That phase required the imple-
mentation of a policy of general rent reduction for tenant farmers in 
the rural areas. That part of Sun's program had been one of the 
planks of the Kuomintang as early as 1930. In that year the central 
government of the newly united Republic of China had promulgated 
a land law which provided (among other things) that farm rentals 
should not exceed 37.5 percent of the total annual yield of agricul-
tural main crops. In conformity with that legislation, rent reductions 
were attempted in Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, and Chekiang prov-
inces. In Hupeh Chen Cheng, himself, proceeded to attempt the im-
plementation of the rent reduction legislation in an effort that was at 
least reasonably successful. 17 
IS. Neil Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 225-226. 
16. John Israel, "Politics on Formosa," in Mark Mancall (ed.), Formosa Today (New 
York: Praeger, 1964), p. 59. 
17. Cf. Chen, Land Reform in Taiwan, pp. 18-19. For Chen's views on land reform 
see Chen Cheng, An Approach to China's Land Reform (Taipei: Chen Cheng, 1951). 
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For a multitude of reasons the efforts on the mainland of China 
had failed, but in 1949 the Kuomintang had every incentive to un-
dertake the attempt once again. With the full approval of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Kuomintang, and the express approval of 
Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Cheng, immediately upon his arrival, was 
instructed to decree a reduction of agrarian land rents in Taiwan to a 
sum no greater than 37.5 percent of the total annual yield of the 
main farm crop. 
The measurable effect of the degree (and its subsequent embod-
iment into law) was immediate. Enforcement was begun in April 
1949 and concluded in September of the same year. By May, 1949, 
302,000 farm families had entered into new lease contracts governed 
by the new rent reduction legislation. Out of the total cultivated 
land area of 2,018,760 acres on Taiwan, 613,000 acres were affected 
by the rent reductions. By 1952, when the program was completed, 
it involved 43 percent of the total number of farm households and 
over 29 percent of the total cultivated land. 
Almost immediately thereafter, the Nationalist government un-
dertook a program to transfer ownership of land to actual tillers by 
selling some of the public land possessed by the central and provin-
cial governments (which involved about 20 percent of the cultivated 
land surface of Taiwan). The price set on public land was 2.5 times 
the annual yield of the principal crops and was to be paid in twenty 
installments over a period of ten years. At the conclusion of the 
program more than 171,700 acres were sold to 139,688 farm families. 
In January 1951 a systematic ownership survey was undertaken 
by a joint Sino-American commission (the Joint Commission on Ru-
ral Reconstruction) in anticipation of the enactment of further land 
reform legislation designed to transfer the ownership of excess land 
from landlords to tillers. In July 1952 the draft of 33 articles, that 
was to serve as the prototype of the subsequent legislation that 
would redistribute land ownership on Taiwan, was submitted to the 
Provincial Assembly. On January 20, 1953 the omnibus legislation 
designed to provide land to actual tillers passed into law. The gov-
ernment then undertook compulsory purchase of all land that ex-
ceeded the prescribed retention limit (three chia or 7.16 acres) to be 
sold to the tenants who were the actual tillers. By December 1953 
the compulsory purchase and resale of land was complete and in-
volved 16.4 percent of the total cultivated land surface of Taiwan. 
Over 344,000 acres of land were purchased and resold to 194,800 
farm families. This redistribution, coupled with the sale of public 
lands, involved 24.5 percent of the total cultivated acreage of 
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Taiwan. 18 
The excess land purchased from landlords was paid for at a 
value set at 2.5 times its annual yield, 70 percent of the compensation 
coming in commodity (rice and sweet potato) bonds and the remain-
der in shares of stock in four government enterprises (the Taiwan 
Cement Corporation, Taiwan Pulp and Paper Corporation, Taiwan 
Industrial and Mining Corporation and Taiwan Agricultural and 
Forestry Development Corporation). The commodity bonds paid a 
4 percent annual interest and both bond principal and interest were 
to be amortized in 20 equal semiannual installments. Tenants 
purchased the land from the government at the price paid by the 
government to the former owners. The purchase price was paid at a 
4 percent annual interest and in direct payments in kind for rice pad-
dies, or in cash payments for land devoted to sweet potato 
cultivation. 
By the end of the rent reduction, public land sales, and land-to-
the-tillers programs, more than 43 percent of all farm families on 
Taiwan had benefited by the statutory reduction in share-cropping 
fees, about 20 percent purchased public lands, and almost 48 percent 
of all farm households had profited from land redistribution. Al-
most half of Taiwan's farm families, or about 75 percent of tenant 
and part-tenant households, were able to purchase at least some 
land. As a consequence, the number of tenant and part-tenant farm 
households as a share of total farm households on Taiwan declined 
from 41 percent in 1947 to 21 percent in 1953, to decline still further 
to 10 percent in 1970. In accordance with Sun's policies of land re-
form more and more tenant farmers became owner-cultivators and a 
ceiling was imposed on land rents. Beyond that, the effects antici-
pated by Sun, less easy to isolate and quantify, radiated throughout 
the island economy. 19 
As Sun Yat-sen and those around him had anticipated, one of 
the most important economic consequences of these changes was an 
outflow from agriculture to the nonagricultural sector amounting to 
abut 22 percent of the total value of agricultural production between 
1950 and 1955.2° This was accomplished, not only by forced land 
18. See Chen, Land Reform, chap. 4; Samuel P.S. Ho, Economic Development of Tai-
wan (New Haven: Yale, 1978), pp. 162-165. 
19. See Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Economic Development (Cairo: National 
Bank of Egypt, 1955). 
20. T.H. Lee, Strategies for Transferring Agricultural Surplus under D!!ferent Agricul-
tural Situations in Taiwan (Taipei: Joint Commission on Agricultural Reconstruction, 
1971 [mimeo]). 
EssAYS ON SuN YAT-SEN 35 
sales but, in part, by the increase in real farm incomes that com-
menced with land reform. In the prewar period (1936-40) the aver-
age propensity to consume among farmers was 92 percent. In the 
period between 1956 and 1960 it had fallen to 80 percent. In effect, 
between 1940 and 1956 the average money-saving-consumption ratio 
in rural households rose from 8 to 20 percent. The substantial sav-
ings that accumulated among farm families in the 1950s could be 
largely attributed to the income redistribution affected throu~ the 
rent reduction and land reform programs of 1949 and 1953. 1 Fi-
nancial institutions transferred that capital to the capital scarce in-
dustrial sector. 
Coupled with compulsory land sales and the high rate of volun-
tary savings, a number of governmental policies ensured a high net 
capital outflow from the agricultural, to the nonagricultural, sector. 
One such policy involved government control over the marketing of 
rice. That was done by making land taxes and land payments paya-
ble in rice, by instituting a schedule of compulsory rice sales to the 
government, and by establishing a rice-fertilizer barter system 
through which farmers obtained critically needed fertilizers only by 
providing rice in exchange. All these rice collections were obtained 
at government prices that were considerably lower than prevailing 
market prices. As a consequence, "invisible" revenues accrued to 
the government that were the equivalent of the difference between 
the government and the market price multiplied by the total amount 
of rice obtained.22 Those revenues became one of the principal 
sources of government funds. 
In order to make the growth dividends from agriculture fuel in-
dustrialization and economic development without generating social 
and political dissidence in the countryside, substantial benefits were 
provided to farm households to supplement the increments in in-
come that attended the process. A number of just such benefits were 
almost immediately forthcoming. In the first place, the entire pro-
gram was supervised closely by the Sino-American Joint Commis-
sion on Rural Reconstruction to ensure that modem agrobiological 
and technological assistance was made available to all farmers, large 
21. T.H. Lee, Intersectoral Capital Flows in the Economic Development of Taiwan, 
1895-1960 (Ithaca: Cornell, 1971), p. 120. 
22. Shirley W.Y. Kuo, "Effects of Land Reform, Agricultural Pricing Policy and 
Economic Growth on Multiple Crop Diversification in Taiwan," Philippines Economic 
Jouma/14, 1-2 (1975), 159-164; see Kuo-shu Liang and T.H. Lee, ''Taiwan," in Shinichi 
lchimura (ed.), The Economic Development of East and Southeast Asia (Honolulu: East-
West Center, 1975), p. 305. 
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or small, on an equal basis. Moreover, the Irrigation Associations, 
sponsored by the government, assured all farmers of adequate water 
supplies-something critical to farming on Taiwan. Furthermore, 
by 1965, the government, through its own agencies or government-
sponsored Farmers' Associations, supplied 65 percent of all agricul-
tural loans under strictly controlled conditions. Before the land re-
form private moneylenders provided 82 percent of the credit 
available to farmers at rates that were all-too-often disabling, if not 
ruinous.23 In 1950 farmers could secure short-term commercial 
loans at no less than 3.45 percent per month-or about 42 percent 
per annum. With government control and the availability of credit 
through the cooperative Farmers' Associations, the rate fell to 1.2 
percent per month-14.5 percent a year-by March, 1964. 
The rice-fertilizer barter system, under the provisions of Provin-
cial Food Bureau allocation, ensured all farmers equal access to lim-
ited supply. In most developing market economies where critical 
agricultural inputs-credit, water and fertilizer-are in short supply, 
it is almost invariably the wealthier cultivators, with the larger hold-
ings, that obtain them. With that advantage the wealthier strata of 
the rural population increase their control over local credit, alienate 
smallholders from their land, and are in a position to further exploit 
impoverished agricultural laborers.24 Land reform and close gov-
ernment supervision made all that impossible on Taiwan. The polit-
ical authorities were following the injunction of Sun Yat-sen that 
"class conflicts between small and large farmers ... be avoided."25 
Thus the developmental program of the Kuomintang provided 
that agriculture would underwrite modernization and industrializa-
tion through net capital transfers from the farm, to the modem, sec-
tors of the economy-just as Sun Yat-sen had anticipated. The 
agricultural sector provided the growth dividends that supplied 
much of the domestic capital on Taiwan, and made up a substantial 
part of the island's international trade deficits. Between 1953 and 
1962 the most binding constraint on Taiwan's development was the 
dearth of foreign exchange. During that period agricultural produc-
tion not only met the domestic food requirements of population 
23. R.P. Christensen, Taiwan's Agricultural .Development (Washington, D.C.: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1968}, p. 57. 
24. Keith Griffin, The Political Economy of Agrarian Change (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard, 1974), p. 30. 
25. Cf. Walter P. Falcon, "Lessons and Issues in Taiwan's Development," in T.H. 
Shen (ed.) Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of .Development: The Taiwan Experience 
(Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 197 4}, p. 271. 
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growing at a very rapid rate, but provided a surplus for exports suffi-
cient to finance at least half of the total imports of the island. Agri-
culture, in conjunction with U.S. economic aid, thus financed the 
early industrialization of the Republic of China on Taiwan.26 For 
all that, per capita and household farm incomes increased, and wel-
fare and life-enhancement benefits were made more and more read-
ily available to the countryside. 
That the first phase of Taiwan's development was so successful 
is at least in part attributable -to the fact that it was initiated by "a 
group of people. . . who had a relatively clear conception of the 
form agricultural development should take. . . ."27 That relatively 
clear conception, in substantial part, was the product of a long famil-
iarity with the development ideology left as an intellectual heritage 
by Sun Yat-sen. 
Over half a century ago Sun argued that resolution of the land 
problem was critical to any program of economic development and 
industrialization. He saw a complex program of land taxation, rent 
reduction, and land-to-the-tillers as providing the mechanisms that 
would make rural resources available for capital formation in China. 
Beyond that, Sun Yat-sen seemed to clearly recognize the dual-
istic structure of China's economy-a small modem sector of nonag-
ricultural pursuits coexisted alongside a basically agricultural 
economy. The development of the nation's economy would require 
gradually shifting the center of gravity from the agrarian, to the 
modem, sectors. Accomplishing that shift would require moderniz-
ing agriculture, generating transferable agricultural surplus, accumu-
lating real capital to sustain nonagricultural employment, and 
finally, reallocating labor from agricultural to nonagricultural pur-
suits. Rather than embarking immediately on an effort to fabricate a 
heavy industrial base for such an economy to the neglect of agricul-
ture, Sun proposed a systematic upgrading of agriculture, infrastruc-
tural development, mass education, an expansion of labor intensive 
industries under a regime of tariff protection, and a final effort to 
create a heavy industrial foundation for a new society. An interven-
tionist government would create a policy environment for private 
economic activity by influencing foreign exchange, credit, trade, tar-
iffs, and foreign investment incentives. These actions would condi-
tion the subsequent course of growth and income streams. Other 
26. Liang and Lee, ''Taiwan," p. 322. 
27. Erik Thorbecke, "Agricultural Development" in Walter Galenson (ed),Economic 
Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell, 1979), p. 204. 
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than that, the government would directly participate in productive 
activities through ownership in the public sector. 
Sun recommended that early in the process the authorities 
would have to initiate a policy of protective tariffs and import con-
trols to insulate native industries-initially labor intensive-against 
any "invasion of foreign goods." In the first stages of its develop-
ment, China would have to impose restrictive tarrifs on foreign im-
ports and "put into effect a protective policy" that would permit 
"home industries. . . to develop."28 
Chiang Kai-shek, as heir to the developmental policies of Sun, 
early committed the Kuomintang to a protectionist, import substitu-
tion policy during the first phase of industrial development. In 1943 
Chiang reiterated all the essentials of Sun's program of phased in-
dustrial development and modernization.29 Critical to that program, 
Chiang went on, China "must. . . adopt a protectionist policy with 
regard to foreign trade, and a policy of economic planning with re-
spect to her industrial development."30 During the first phase of 
Chinese development, primary comestible and nondurable consumer 
production must be assured, rendered maximally efficient and mod-
ernized, through a policy of protection. Such a program of sheltered 
growth, administered by the state, was calculated to help "transform 
an agricultural into an industrial society."31 
Along with a land reform and protectionist policy, Chiang, like 
Sun, committed himself to an aggressive and interventionist role for 
the tutelary state. Central to the convictions of Sun's International 
JJevelopment of China was the conception of the state as a central 
28. Sun Yat-sen, San-min cltu-i (Taipei: China Publishing, n.d.}, p. 209. 
29. See Chiang, "Chinese Economic Theory," pp. 259-262. The commitment to tariff 
control and import substitution had been explicit in Chiang's writings as early as 1928 
and 1929. In a speech entitled "My Reflections on Customs Tariffs," Chiang maintained: 
"Our ability to escape from foreign economic bondage depends on our control over cus-
toms regulations. Our agricultural, industrial and commercial development is re-
tarded. . . . The tariff regulations imposed upon us by foreign governments permit 
foreign products to overwhelm our own. Our imports exceed our exports and we incur 
losses in trade deficits. This is the most difficult constraint on our economic develop-
ment. . . . We will continue to struggle for full control of our customs regulations. Our 
purpose is our national economic development. . . . The full control over our customs 
regulation was one of the objectives pursued by our Tsung-li [Sun Yat-sen] for years." 
Chiang T'sung t'ung 9, 127; compare ibid., 9, 22, and "Chinese Economic Theory," pp. 
267-273, 283. 
30. Chiang, "Chinese Economic Theory," p. 279. 
31. Chiang Kai-shek, "Chapters on National Fecundity, Social Welfare, Education 
and Health and Happiness," Supplement to San-min cltu-i (Taipei: China Publishing, 
n.d.), p. 218; compare San-min cltu-i, pp. 208-209. 
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management agency for the entire economy.32 State planning would 
be indicative rather than prescriptive because the developmental 
program, by design, would involve a large private sector and an at-
tendant market economy. Given such circumstances-as well as the 
necessity of seeking a substantial inflow of foreign capital, and en-
trepreneurial and technological expertise-government planning in 
China would proceed under the constraints implicit in allowing the 
operation of domestic and foreign private enterprise facilitated by 
"liberal laws." 
Planning, under such money and commodity market con-
straints, could only be indicative. The state would control financial 
institutions and enterprises of scale, but vast sectors of the system 
would respond to price signals provided by the market. Such a 
mixed economy would have to allow for the uncertainties that are 
the product of opportunity costs and factor advantages characteristic 
of open, or relatively open, markets. Sun early recognized that one 
of the advantages enjoyed by China was its evident abundance of 
cheap labor. China could attract foreign and domestic private ven-
ture capital with its low cost labor.33 Some substantial part of Chi-
nese development could thus be underwritten by foreign and private 
capital seeking advantage in producing goods at competitive prices 
for international trade.34 Planning, as a consequence, would have to 
be suggestive rather than prescriptive, flexible rather than rigid, in-
volving the provision and employment of incentives and disincen-
tives as policy instruments, rather than the issuance of quota 
assignments and specific resource allocations common to public 
planning in command economies. 
Other than the provision of general economic plans, the tutelary 
state would be charged with the responsibility of protecting collec-
tive welfare throughout the process of economic development and 
industrialization. It would, in Sun's view, not only foster the estab-
lishment and growth of initially cost-inefficient industries, and pro-
vide for balanced growth, but would attempt to provide for more 
equitable income and welfare distribution. In this latter regard, Sun 
Y at-sen advocated a decentralization of industrial development in 
32. Sun, International Development in China in Kuo:fu ch,iian-chi (Taipei: Kuomin-
tang Party History Committee, 1973), 5, p. 135; compare Sun, San-min chu-i, pp. 158-
160, 180-182; "How to Develop Chinese Industry," Fundamentals, p. 189. 
33. Sun, International Development of China, pp. 297, 300, 310, 333, "Cheng chien 
chih piao-shih" [The Expression of Political Opinion), Kuo-.fu ch,iian-chi, 2, 303. 
34. Sun, International Development of China, pp. 129-130, 132, 138, 182, 197, 276, 
306, San-min chu-i, pp. 205,210. 
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China in order to ensure the modernization and economic matura-
tion of all geographic areas of the country, as well as more equitable 
distribution of the attendant benefits.35 Conjoined with currency 
regulation, tax reform and land redistribution, the state would en-
sure more equitable income allocation and general welfare provision 
through geographically balanced growth. 
A generation later, when Chiang Kai-shek faced the prospect of 
implementing Sun's program, he assumed essentially the same pos-
tures. He reaffirmed the role of the state, the necessities of land re-
form and income and welfare equity. He spoke of foreign 
investment and international cooperation in the development of 
China. And he advocated a decentralization of industrial develop-
ment in order to ensure that "industry [would] be distributed 
equally," bringing "cities and rural districts ... into equilibrium."36 
Thus, both Sun and Chiang conceived China's development as 
proceeding through intensive involvement in the worldwide market 
economy. Both maintained that the development of China would be 
inspired and directed by the interventionist state controlling private 
capital and foreign trade through a comprehensive policy that would 
ensure balanced growth, decentralized industry, substantial equality 
in income distribution, opportunities for private economic initia-
tives, and competitiveness in the international market. In the pro-
cess there would be increasing provision of social services and the 
creation of requisite human capital through expanded welfare and 
educational facilities that would extend longevity, enhance public 
health, and make literacy universat.37 
This was the schematic outline of a plan of agricultural develop-
ment and industrialization that the Kuomintang brought with it 
upon its arrival on Taiwan. By 1953, the commitment to the creation 
of a "model province" involved all the energies of the leadership of 
the government of the Republic of China. By that time it was evi-
dent that a return to the Mainland, lost to the forces of Mao Zedong, 
would involve an indeterminate length of time. The only viable op-
tion that remained to the heirs of Sun Yat-sen was the effort to pro-
ceed with the development of a min-sheng society on the remnant of 
the nation that remained under Kuomintang control. By 1953, land 
reform had already been substantially accomplished, and a policy of 
industrialization through import substitution was initiated. 
35. See Sun, Inremalional Developmenl of China, pp. 144, 147. 
36. Chiang, "Chapters," op cil., p. 287. 
37. See ibid., pp. 231, 242,272,318. 
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In September 1953 the Economic Stabilization Board, and its 
subsidiary, the Industrial Development Commission, were created. 
The creation of such cabinet level agencies provided the centralized 
parastate machinery for administering the program of development. 
Such agencies faced a tangle of problems including a population rate 
of increase that exceeded 3 percent per annum-increasing Taiwan's 
population by nearly three million between 1946 and 1953-and a 
sizeable trade deficit that threatened the island's foreign reserves. 
With the loss of markets in Japan or mainland China, and the high 
demand environment for food and non-durable consumer goods on 
the island, a variety of small-scale consumer goods and simple man-
ufacturing industries had sprung up on Taiwan between 1946 and 
1950. Without import controls and the extensive use of foreign-ex-
change restraints, such industries, characterized by poor quality and 
high production costs, would have rapidly succumbed to foreign 
competition. 
By the early 1950s an increasing number of commodities were 
removed from the list of permissible imports and constrained by im-
port controls in order to provide domestic industry an environment 
of sheltered growth. To this end a whole range of consumer goods 
such as cotton and woolen yam and man-made fibers were placed 
under control. The import of products such as leather and leather 
manufactures, cement, chemical fertilizers, soap, paper, tin plate, 
sewing machines, bicycles and motorcycles were "temporarily sus-
pended" or "controlled" by the trade control agencies. Such discre-
tionary controls over imports provided a major instrument of infant 
industry protection and promotion. Conjoined with the land reform 
legislation and income redistribution, foreign-exchange and import 
controls affected massive capital flows into the industrializing sector 
of the island's economy. The impact of foreign-exchange and import 
constraints on the one hand, and the income redistribution that at-
tended land reform, produced terms of trade and a price structure 
heavily in favor of the new import-substituting industries. As a con-
sequence, the prices of non-durable consumer goods, like textiles, 
rose sharply, only to fall as the domestic production of textiles ex-
panded in response to the incentives provided by a protected market. 
Under such circumstances, by 1954 domestic production supplied an 
estimated 77 percent of manufactured domestic requirements, pri-
marily in the consumer goods subsectors such as textiles and apparel, 
wood products and furniture, leather manufactures and printing. In 
comparison, in 1937, imported goods accounted for more than 70 
percent of Taiwan's apparent domestic consumption of manufac-
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tured goods. Protection had reduced Taiwan's high rate of import 
dependency not only for nonfood manufacturing as a whole, but for 
most of the remaining subsectors as well. In terms of the sources of 
demand for the nascent industries, the substitution of actual and po-
tential imports is estimated to have provided as much as 91 percent 
of the effective market demand and for the more than 229 percent 
increase in net value added in nonfood manufacturing during the 
period between the last year of peak prewar production and 1954.38 
While fostering domestic industrial production, direct govern-
ment actions were critical in supplying large-scale overhead capital 
to the emerging pattern of industrial development. There was a con-
certed effort to expand the transportation infrastructure. Within a 
short period of time railway development provided road and rail 
density measured in meters per square kilometer of area second only 
to that of Japan. Power generation projects were undertaken (sup-
ported as we have seen with U.S. project aid allocations) that al-
lowed capacity to remain well ahead of demand at realistic pricing 
levels. The authorities also established a number of industry-ori-
ented technology and investment institutes (such as the China Pro-
ductivity and Trade Center, the Food Industry Research and 
Development Institute and the Industrial Development and Invest-
ment Center) to afford management training, marketing informa-
tion, and technical assistance as well as credit for industrial 
entrepreneurs. 
In effect, flexible macroeconomic planning, facilitated by the 
policy and fiscal mechanisms to which allusion has been made, suc-
ceeded in redirecting foreign exchange resources for the purpose of 
infrastructural construction, sheltering and expanding existing in-
dustry, and providing profit incentives to the relatively inexperi-
enced domestic modernizing entrepreneurial class. With 
agricultural expansion providing the bulk of domestic capital to 
finance nonagricultural development, the necessary foundation for 
the subsequent stages of industrial growth was laid. Between 1949 
and 1954 manufacturing production increased at an average annual 
rate of 22 percent. The rehabilitation of plants damaged during the 
war provided some of its substance, but the policy of import substi-
tution and sheltered growth exerted considerable influence on its 
pace and character.39 The first four-year plan (1953-1956) shifted 
38. Ching-yuan Lin,Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946-72 (New York: Praeger, 1973), 
Chap. 4; Ho, Economic IJevelopment of Taiwan, pp. 187-88. 
39. Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History," Modem China, 5, 3 (July, 
1979), pp. 364-365; Hsing Mo-huan, John H. Power, and Gerardo P. Sicat, Taiwan and 
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the planning emphasis from security and economic stabilization, that 
had prevailed from 1949 to 1952, to development. Heavy commit-
ments were made to infrastructural, human resources, agriculture 
production, and industrial, projects.40 
Whatever the motives that inspired it, and whatever the suc-
cesses that attended it, the first four-year plan did not solve Taiwan's 
foreign exchange problems. The development of import substitution 
industries required large-scale capital and raw materials imports. 
Manufacturing output on Taiwan doubled between 1952 and 1958 
and real gross domestic product grew at a substantial rate of 7.1 per-
cent per annum.41 The Taiwan Production Board oversaw the rapid 
expansion of the textile industry and the increasing production of 
plastics, artificial fibre, glass, cement, fertilizer, plywood and chemi-
cals-all of which required the import of basic raw materials. As a 
consequence, the balance of payments remained heavily in deficit, 
with exports financing only about 60 percent of imports throughout 
the entire period. The shortfall was made up by United States aid-
but since the deficit showed no disposition to decline, and American 
aid could not be expected to last forever, some alternatives had to be 
sought. 
There was little prospect that domestic industries, responding to 
indigenous demand, would ultimately be sufficiently profitable to 
supply the requisite funds. Domestic markets were too small to pro-
vide for the necessary economies of scale. By 1956 there was evi-
dence of domestic market saturation.42 By the end of the '50s "many 
plants producing simple manufactures, such as woolen textiles, ply-
wood, paper, rubber goods, soap, iron rods and bars, insulated wires, 
sewing machines, and electric fans, were operating at only 40 percent 
to 70 percent of capacity."43 Private sector gross investment in fixed 
capital formation, as a consequence, fell from 56 percent in 1954 to 
41 percent in 1958.44 "As to the lack of investment ... ," K.T. Li 
explained at the time, "it is because productive sectors with hand-
some returns but involving little risk have been developed more or 
the Philippines: Industrialization and Trade Policies (London: Oxford University, 1970), 
pp. 238-266. 
40. See Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei: Council for International Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1971), pp. 147, 149-150, Tables 11-5 and 11-7. 
41. See Industry of Free China, January 1955, p. 33. 
42. See the speech of P. Kiang, then Minister of Economic Affairs, in Industry of Free 
China, October 1956, pp. 2-3. 
43. Liang and Lee, ''Taiwan," p. 295. 
44. Chang, Economic Development in Taiwan, p. 80, Table 2-31. 
44 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
less to a saturation point and can no longer absorb more invest-
ment."45 The satisfaction of effective demand in the internal market 
produced a decline in the rate of overall manufacturing growth, a 
reduction of investment, a substantial price decline in non-durable 
consumer goods and increasing competition among producers. 
At the close of the first four-year plan Taiwan was clearly ap-
proaching a critical stage in its economic development. Unlike most 
other LDCs similarly circumstanced, the authorities on Taiwan de-
cided that a change in course would be required to reduce foreign 
indebtedness and dependency on American aid, sustain overall 
growth, and extend and intensify industrialization. The second four-
year plan (1957-1960) drawn up at the close of 1956 already con-
tained the elements of redirection. There was a clear commitment to 
the expansion of exports in the effort to increase domestic private 
investment and reduce foreign indebtedness. The leadership on Tai-
wan recognized that "easy" import substitution had come to an end 
and the only alternative that remained, if industrial development 
was to continue, was export-led growth. 
For an economy situated like that of Taiwan such an option 
could only produce far-reaching reassessment of existing policy. It 
was clear that the first stage of growth was inspired by a program-
matic strategy embodied in the writings of Sun and reflected in the 
doctrinal commitments expressed by Chiang Kai-shek. That strat-
egy and those commitments, however, presupposed continental 
China as the economic base for Chinese economic modernization 
and industrialization. Given that assumption development would 
have been predicated on a generous resource base, a vast pool of 
relatively cheap labor, and a large internal market. The situation on 
Taiwan was radically different. Taiwan had a restricted market, 
very few mineral and subsoil fossil fuel resources and severely lim-
ited agricultural endowments. Its irregular rainfall allowed little po-
tential for the development of hydroelectric power. The only 
competitive advantage enjoyed by the Taiwanese economy was its 
abundance oflabor, upgraded by extensive educational facilities that 
had been established during the first four-year plan. Employing that 
supply of labor in industry could only take the form of adding value 
to imported, rather than domestically available materials. 
For his part, Sun Yat-sen had been insistent upon the interna-
tional competitive advantage of low labor-factor costs in the devel-
45. K.T. Li, "A Review of the Economic Situation in Taiwan in 1958," Industry of 
Free China, March 1959, p. 8. 
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opment of the Chinese economy. To exploit that endowment, he 
counselled Chinese programmers to support economic development 
and industrialization by selecting "the most remunerative field. . . 
in order to attract foreign capital." To exploit its comparative ad-
vantages, China would have to judiciously weigh opportunity costs 
("the most suitable positions must be chosen") and pursue the "lines 
of least resistance" in putting together specific programs.46 Given 
Taiwan's lack of natural resources, after the stage of sheltered 
growth had been concluded, only its abundant supply of efficient la-
bor could fuel subsequent growth. Without mainland China's re-
sources and internal market as its base, Taiwan's development was 
obliged to shift into export-led modalities. 
Given its limited choices in seeking "the most remunerative 
field," any effort to attempt to promote development on Taiwan 
through export-led growth involved several preconditions. In the 
first place competitiveness of Taiwanese exports on the world market 
required that local manufacturers have access to imported raw 
materials, components, and capital equipment at no more than 
world prices. Since all the raw materials and productive components 
necessary for export production would have to be imported, such 
materials could account for about 65 to 70 percent of selling value. 
This meant that any import duties, commodity taxes, or surcharges 
might very well make exports non-competitive on the world market. 
In 1954, for example, the commodity tax applied to domestically 
produced and imported goods was levied at 15 percent on cotton 
yam and rayon staple fiber yam, 20 percent on artificial filament 
yam, and 30 percent on woolen yam. Such taxes alone were enough 
to make such textile goods non-competitive in international trade.47 
Only if such taxes were rebated or eliminated on goods for export 
could their profitability and competitiveness on the world market be 
restored. Moreover, even if imported raw materials could be ob-
tained at no more than world prices, only relatively efficient labor 
could provide the margin that would make exports capable of re-
turning enough to reduce foreign indebtedness. 
To attempt to satisfy these preconditions of export-led growth, 
!he Kuomintang authorities, as early as 1955, worked for the passage 
of the "Regulations for Rebate of Taxes on Export Products" that 
would rebate the taxes on imported inputs that threatened to reduce 
or eliminate the margin between input costs and selling value that 
46. Sun, International .Development of China, pp. 297, 300, 303, 310, 333. 
47. Maurice Scott, "Foreign Trade," in Galenson, op. cit., p. 321. 
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made export goods profitable. Secondly, there were moves to de-
value the national currency so that nontraded inputs (chiefly wages) 
would be reduced relative to international costs. Moreover, given 
government control of the basic staples in the national diet, food 
costs could be kept relatively low, further reducing the wage costs for 
potential exporters. 
In 1957 the state Bank of Taiwan introduced low cost loans as 
incentives to exports (at 6 percent per annum payable in foreign ex-
change). Government export insurance was provided, direct subsi-
dies were offered to promising export industries, and export 
marketing research was made available by government institutes. In 
1958 a major foreign exchange reform was undertaken, dismantling 
the multiple exchange rate system that had prevailed during the 
phase of import substitution.48 In 1959 tariff rates for a number of 
finished goods and their major imported components were reduced. 
Import controls, mechanisms employed to protect infant industry de-
velopment, were relaxed and more and more items were removed 
from control. 
During the second four-year plan a long list of modifications in 
the foreign exchange, commodity tax, import controls, fiscal and 
monetary policies added up to a major change in the developmental 
program of the government. There was a shift from an essentially 
domestic raw materials or agricultural-based, to an imported raw 
materials and labor-based, pattern of development and industrializa-
tion. After 1960 Taiwan's development was to be sustained by ex-
ploiting its relative economic advantages in terms of a relatively 
abundant supply of labor combined with growing entrepreneurial 
skills to penetrate world markets with the products of Taiwan's la-
bor-intensive consumer goods industries. 
At the end of the second four-year plan, an Accelerated Eco-
nomic Development Program was formulated, which together with a 
19-Point Financial and Economic Reform Program was designed to 
improve the climate for private investment, stimulate the growth of 
private-sector industry, and improve the foreign exchange situation. 
An Industrial Development and Investment Center was instituted, 
and in 1960 the Statute for Encouragement of Investment was 
promulgated, providing the legislative basis for development during 
the third four-year plan (1961-1964). 
During this period there was a rapid increase in net domestic 
savings, which rose from 18 percent of gross capital formation in 
48. Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, pp. 74-76. 
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1959 to 60.6 percent in 1965. The ratio of foreign to indigenous capi-
tal declined from 46 percent in 1959 to 16 percent in 1965.49 Invest-
ment accrued to the modem sectors of the economy resulting in 
major structural changes. The share of manufactured products to 
total exports averaged 41 percent during the period between 1959 
and 1965, compared with the average of 12 percent for the interval 
between 1952 and 1958.50 Many of the import substitution products 
developed during the period of sheltered growth-processed food-
stuffs, beverages, tobacco, textiles, leather, wood items, paper and 
related products--constituted 58 percent of the total increase in ex-
ports between 1959 and 1965. Reflecting domestic factor endow-
ments, the first period of export-led growth involved two major 
industrial subsectors: processed food production and textiles-both 
of which were labor-intensive. The food processing industry was 
more capital intensive than the average of Taiwanese industries, but 
the accomplishments of the island's agriculture made the export of 
agricultural products particularly profitable. Nonetheless labor-in-
tensive consumer and consumer-oriented goods dominated the prod-
uct mix of Taiwanese exports during the first phase of "outward 
directed" economic growth. By the mid-1960s there was a shift to 
more capital and technological-intensive subsectors of the intermedi-
ate goods industries. The emphasis began to shift from cement and 
paper to chemicals and petroleum products. Durable consumer 
goods industries began their expansion in the mid-1960s with ma-
chinery and electrical machinery manufacture. 
As a consequence of these changes, the industrial sector of the 
economy expanded at a 20 percent annual rate compared to the 10 
percent annual rate of the 1950s. Attending this growth was a 
proliferation of state institutions to service the special needs of in-
dustrial subsectors. The Industrial Development and Investment 
Center was expanded and a Medium and Small-Sized Enterprises 
Assistance Working Group was formed to assist small-scale enter-
prises in obtaining credit, developing managerial and marketing 
skills, and gaining access to the latest manufacturing techniques. A 
Metal Industries Development Center was devoted to providing sim-
ilar assistance to the metallurgical industries, and the Union Indus-
trial Research Institute conducted research and provided 
information on organic, inorganic, petroleum, and agricultural 
chemicals, metallurgy and construction materials. 
49. Chang, Economic Development in Taiwan, p. 680, Table Il-l. 
50. Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei: Economic Planning Council, 1976), p. 182. 
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The fourth and fifth four-year plans (1965-1968, 1969-1972) in-
volved a period of rapid overall growth of the economy. Per capita 
income growth rates more than doubled. The industrial sector grew 
dramatically. B.etween 1962 and 1972 the share of chemical, basic 
metal, and machinery products increased in net contribution to the 
gross domestic product from about 25 percent to about 50 percent of 
the total. 5 1 Textile and apparel production held their own relative to 
aggregate manufacturing output. At the same time the agricultural 
sector continued its dynamic growth. With the absence of such con-
tinuous agricultural expansion, the supply of labor at competitive 
costs would be threatened and cost inflation would erode the relative 
advantages enjoyed by Taiwanese exports on the world market. In 
fact, the economic success of Taiwan's developmental program 
would have been seriously compromised had it not been for the gen-
erally balanced growth of agriculture and industry. 
Such balanced growth would not have been possible if infras-
tructural development had not taken place during the preliminary 
phases of post-war restabilization and restoration. As we have seen, 
both Sun and Chiang had emphasized the importance of infrastruc-
tural articulation in any program of sustained economic growth and 
modernization. Given the network of roads and rails, conjoined 
with ready access to energy supplies at realistic price levels, both in-
dustry and agriculture could enjoy the benefits of technological inno-
vation. More than that, the availability of such an infrastructure 
permitted the relatively dispersed rural character of Taiwanese in-
dustrialization. Gustav Ranis credits that regional character of man-
ufacturing a "key" to Taiwan's successful growth and 
industrialization. 52 
Perhaps the most interesting features of the entire process of in-
dustrialization on Taiwan tum on the creative implementation of 
Sun's policies by the planning agencies of the government. The vari-
ous elements of his program were combined in a fashion that permit-
ted their interpenetration and mutual support. 
The fact that industrial development on Taiwan did not pro-
duce the disabling urbanization with its high social overhead costs 
and population dislocations characteristic of the same process in 
other LDCs was largely the consequence of the fact that the propor-
51. Henry Y. Wan, "Manpower, Industrialization and Export-led Growth," in Yuan-
li Wu and Kung-chia Yeh (eds.), Growth, Distribution and Social Change: Essays on the 
Economy of the Republic of China (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 
1978), p. 144, Table 3. 
52. Gustav Ranis, "Industrial Development," in Galenson, op. cit. , p. 222. 
ESSAYS ON SUN YAT-SEN 49 
tion of industrial establishments located in the five largest cities on 
the island did not substantially change in the twenty years between 
1951 and 1970. The proportion of persons employed in manufactur-
ing occupations in the cities, in fact, actually declined from 43 to 37 
percent between 1956 and 1966 and remained virtually unchanged 
into the 1970s. This was rendered possible because industrial estab-
lishments could employ part-time, seasonal, and commuter rural la-
bor without depopulating the countryside. That this was 
accomplished was contingent on the availability of rapid and effi-
cient transportation as well as the provision of energy to "ruralized" 
manufacturing establishments at competitive costs. Without the an-
tecedent development of a communications, transportation and en-
ergy supply infrastructure the ruralization of industry would have 
been impossible. 
That rural labor could be so employed allowed farm households 
to enjoy the wage benefits available in the industrial sector-thereby 
tending to equalize family income between the rural and urban ar-
eas. By 1960 less than 50 percent of Taiwan's farm families were 
fully engaged in farming, 31 percent were employed at least part- . 
time in the nonagricultural sector, and a full 20 percent considered 
agriculture only as a supplementary source of income. In 1964 non-
agricultural income made up 32 percent of total farm family income, 
while by 1972 more than 50 percent of farm household income 
originated in the nonagricultural sectors. 53 The supplement to farm 
household incomes which derived from participation in the nonagri-
cultural sectors not only provided an increased measure of income 
equity, but also allowed a steady increase in the effective demand 
that would fuel continued industrial growth throughout the 1960s. 
All of this was fostered by the political authorities on Taiwan by 
a concerted effort to reduce any advantages industry might enjoy by 
concentrating in urban settings. Rural electrification and equality 
between urban and rural power rates reduced any economic incen-
tives that might have skewed the pattern of industrial development 
on the island. The government invested in rural industrial estates, 
organizing the essential physical overheads that would make such 
rural locations attractive to private industry. By 1966 seventeen such 
53. Ho, Economic Development in Taiwan, p. 254; Ranis, "Industrial Development," 
pp. 228-229. See also Shih Chien-sheng, "The Contribution of Education to Economic 
Development in Taiwan," Conference on Population and Economic Development in 
Taiwan, Institute of Economics, Taipei, 1976, and Pien Yu-yuan, Kung yelt ltua yti nung 
chia sltuo t~ fen p'ei [Industrialization and Agricultural Income Distribution) (Taipei: 
Academia Sinica, 1979). 
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rural industrial areas had been established in which the government 
provided the necessary communications, transportation, and over-
head adjuncts-and then sold plots to private investors. 
The decentralization of industrial development on Taiwan af-
forded manufacturing establishments direct access to the economy's 
major productive asset: abundant and efficient labor. That the labor 
force was efficient was at least in part the consequence of the educa-
tional program initiated almost immediately upon the political stabi-
lization of the island. The supply of rural labor readily trainable 
into semi-skilled workers was a critical input into Taiwan's rapid in-
dustrialization.54 Manpower development programs in terms of edu-
cational expenditures have involved at least one-quarter of the total 
provincial budget on Taiwan since 1952 (compared to the 6.42 per-
cent of total provided in the best years of the Japanese administra-
tion). 55 During the period of labor-intensive production that 
extended through the 1960s into the early 1970s the textile, chemical, 
and telecommunications assembly industries depended largely on 
semi-skilled workers produced in large numbers in the educational 
campaigns of the 1950s. By 1968 the effort to upgrade the labor 
force prompted the extension of publicly financed education from six 
to nine years. By 1970 economic development on Taiwan was 
unique in the extent to which attention was devoted to mass educa-
tion. As a developing nation Taiwan's educational system more 
closely approximates those of a developed nation like the United 
Kingdom than those of the "third world."56 
Sun's emphasis on mass education, insisted upon as early as his 
reform proposals to Li Hung-chang in 1894 and repeated throughout 
his life, had become part of the developmental ideology of the Kuo-
mintang. In 1953, when Chiang Kai-shek wrote the two concluding 
chapters to Sun's incomplete lectures on the San-min chu-i, he de-
voted considerable space to the necessity of an educational program 
that would train students to enter into the productive activities of the 
nation.57 The mass literacy campaigns of the 1950s, and the sus-
tained emphasis on education during the major growth periods, pro-
54. Wan, "Manpower, Industrialization and Export-led Growth," pp. 161-163. 
55. Chang, Economic Development in Taiwan, p. 631, Table 10-3; Social We!fare In-
dicators, Republic of China 1979 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Develop-
ment, September 1979), p. 68, Table A-6. 
56. See Educational Statistics of the Republic of China (Taipei Ministry of Education, 
1979); United Nation's Statistical Yearbook 1979 (New York: United Nations, 1979); 
Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge: Harvard, 1978), p. 71, n.9. 
57. Chiang, "Chapters," pp. 258, 261, 270, 277. 
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vided the semi-skilled and skilled manpower so essential to Taiwan's 
economic growth and development. 
All the elements insisted upon by Sun-the articulation of a 
requisite infrastructure, the decentralization of industry, and mass 
education had been put together by the authorities on Taiwan in a 
fashion that permitted sustained agricultural and industrial growth 
while maintaining relative family income equity. Long familiar with 
the economic programs of min-sheng, the administrators and plan-
ners of Taiwan's development had affected programs that had 
moved Taiwan out of a substantially traditional economic system to 
one that had become increasingly modem while satisfying the essen-
tials of Sun's social goals. 
Between 1953 and 1974, industrial production on Taiwan in-
creased at an annual average rate of 14.4 percent. Disaggregated, 
the rate of growth averaged 12.2 percent during the first half of the 
period and then accelerated to 17.2 percent during the subsequent 
half. Industrial production as a proportion of net domestic product 
rose from 11 percent to 31 percent of the total. By 1973 domestic 
savings as a percent of national income had increased to 32.3 per-
cent, higher than any economy in Asia, and higher than most of the 
world's economies. By 1974 almost 84 percent of Taiwan's exports 
were industrial products. The composition of Taiwan's imports 
changed until by 1975 consumption goods amounted to only 7 per-
cent of total imports and raw materials and capital goods had in-
creased to 61 and 32 percent respectively. Export volume 
accelerated throughout this period, increasing at an average 23 per-
cent per annum from 1960 to 1973. Because exports rose faster than 
imports (which grew at a rate of 18 percent per annum during this 
period) the trade balance improved and by 1964 exports financed 
about 100 percent of imports of goods and services. In 1963 the 
United States decided to terminate concessional aid to Taiwan in 
1965 and it was estimated that the Republic of China on Taiwan, 
without aid supports, could self-sustain a rate of growth of about 6 to 
7 percent per annum. In fact, the rate of growth from 1964 through 
1972 was about 10 percent per annum. Given the circumstances, af-
ter 1964 the government on Taiwan had little reason to concern itself 
about the balance of payments. Foreign loans and long-term foreign 
capital inflow was used to build up fixed assets and foreign exchange 
reserves, with exports of Taiwanese goods and services financing on 
average about 99 percent of imports. 
By the early 1970s the Republic of China on Taiwan was recog-
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nized as a "hero" of development and industrialization.58 Few, if 
any, LDCs had recorded such a remarkable history of stable, bal-
anced growth. For two decades Taiwan's growth exceeded the target 
set by the United Nations Decade of Development. The rate of 
growth in national income (valued in U.S. dollars) was 6.2 percent 
per annum during the first four-year plan (1953-1956), accelerating 
to 6.5 percent between 1957 and 1960, and to 9.7 percent between 
1961 and 1970. Per capita income rose during the same period, from 
2.6 percent per annum during the first four-year plan, to increase to 
3.1 percent between 1957 and 1960, and 6.5 percent per annum be-
tween 1961 and 1970. In two decades, a major structural change in 
the economy had occurred. Between 1953 and 1968 the share of ag-
ricultural output in the nation's gross domestic production fell from 
41.8 to 24.4 percent, and the share of industry rose from 11.6 to 21.2 
percent. Taiwan was no longer a traditional agrarian country. By 
1970 Taiwan was a "semi-developed" country well on its way to eco-
nomic maturation. 
What becomes clear is that much of that impressive perform-
ance had been prefigured in the programmatic plans left to the Kuo-
mintang by Sun Yat-sen. The recognition that the economic 
development of China required a transfer of capital from the less 
dynamic agricultural, to the more dynamic industrial, sectors was 
already explicit by about 1905. All the intellectuals who collected 
around Sun's revolutionary standard recognized that domestic capi-
tal formation required intersectoral capital flows. The program of 
"equalization of land rights," with government acquisition of 
unearned increment, was one device for accomplishing such trans-
fers. It was also the device that was politically least objectionable. 
For at least that reason, it was given prominent place in a develop-
mental program that came to include rent reform and land redistri-
bution as well. The entire program was one that anticipated a rapid 
growth in agricultural production under the spur of rent reduction 
and land redistribution, and a consequent transfer of capital from 
the traditional to the modem sector. The accumulation of domestic 
capital would be supplemented by foreign capital and foreign techni-
cal assistance. Exploiting its natural endowments, and sheltered by a 
system of import controls, the infant industries of China would take 
root. Using its available supply of low-cost labor China could com-
pete effectively in the world market earning enough foreign ex-
58. See Herman Kahn, World Economic IJeve/opment/979 and Beyond (Bounder: 
Westview, 1979), Chapter 6. 
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change to reduce initial foreign indebtedness, while building up its 
stock of domestic capitaP9 The subsequent growth of industry 
would be decentralized along the communications, transportation, 
and energy supply network provided by initial heavy investment in 
infrastructure. 
All of this was undertaken, as Sun had advocated, under the 
aegis of a tutelary state. Land reform and land redistribution were 
designed and implemented by the state. Executive and legislative 
government actions controlled the prices of domestic comestibles, 
raw materials, and intermediary inputs into the economy. Education 
and infrastructural development was initiated by government pro-
grams, while licensing, quotas and tariffs controlled the flow of inter-
national commerce. That Sun's plans were implemented on Taiwan 
rather than on mainland China obviously involved significant 
changes in emphasis, the need for alternative instrumentalities, and 
different assessments of opportunity costs. That Taiwan was all but 
totally devoid of natural resources, and had only a small real and 
potential domestic market for its industrial goods, meant that any 
expansion in the modem sector would have to be export-led. But 
even under such circumstances, Sun's recognition that low cost labor 
would be critical to China's development permitted a strategy of ex-
port-led growth based on labor-intensive commodity production. 
This would be supported by direct state intervention in terms of re-
bates, tax holidays, easy credit, government sponsored unified and 
joint marketing programs, as well as state-established industrial es-
tates and export processing zones. As Sun had anticipated, the role 
of the state in the management of capital accumulation became cen-
tral to the economic modernization and industrialization of the Re-
public of China.60 Although the manufacturing production of the 
public sector declined from 56.2 percent of total output in 1952 to 
22.4 percent in 1970,61 the tutelary state remained the critical manag-
59. Sun had always understood that China would have to expand its foreign trade in 
order to generate the foreign reserves necessary for accelerated development. He argued 
that China's large pool of low-cost labor afforded the opportunity of providing agricul-
tural and textile products for export. Such commodities would attract foreign investment 
because of their international competitive advantage. See Sun, International Development 
of China, pp. 129-130, 132, 138, 276, 306, and San-min chu-i, pp. 205-210. In a speech to 
the Nationalist Chinese Economic Commission in November 1945, Chiang Kai-shek re-
flected Sun's admonitions concerning the advantages of export trade based on low-cost 
labor. See Chiang T'sung t'ung, 17, 33. 
60. Keith Griffin, "An Assessment of Development in Taiwan," World Development, 
1, 6 (June 1973), 31, Table 1. 
61. Amsden, ''Taiwan's Economic History," p. 366; Taiwan Statistical Data Yearbook 
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ing agent for resource allocation and indicative planning. 
Government policy on Taiwan reflected Sun's injunction that 
"all matters that can be and are better carried out by private enter-
prise should be left to private hands which should be encouraged 
and fully protected by liberallaws."62 That, conjoined with China's 
expected involvement in international trade and finance implied an 
indicative planning policy reflected in the programmatic outlines 
provided by the state at regular intervals. Planning under such cir-
cumstances provides a general guide to potential investors and entre-
preneurs and affords a priority list for internal decision making. In 
its entirely such a plan is a flexible program that emphasizes a goal. 
The general population is provided insight into what is expected, 
foreign investors are reassured, and the entire economy is given a 
sense of mission and accomplishment. 
By the late 1970s it had become obvious that Taiwan had 
achieved a remarkable level of economic maturity. Almost every 
feature of the program that had animated that development is trace-
able to the intellectual heritage of Sun Yat-sen. Not only has the 
Republic of China on Taiwan attained a level of economic maturity 
rare among developing countries, but it has accomplished its goals 
without sacrificing the social purpose of Sun Yat-sen. The Republic 
of China on Taiwan has not only attained levels of literacy and 
measures of the quality of life for its citizens unmatched in other 
developing countries, it has done so by maintaining a degree of fam-
ily income equity unique in the contemporary world-far more equi-
table than any other developing country and more equitable than 
that of many developed socialist countries.63 
Much of the intellectual substance and egalitarian inspiration 
that animated that singular performance originated in the thought of 
Sun Yat-sen, one ofthe first "third world" theoreticians of rapid eco-
nomic development produced in our revolutionary century. His vi-
sion remains relevant to our times-his programmatic suggestions 
insightful and practical, and his normative commitments persuasive 
and appealing. 
1971 (Taipei: Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development, 
1971), p. 56, Table S-4. 
62. Sun, lntemotionol Development of Chino, p. 9. For the influence of Sun's ideas on 
the policies of Chiang Kai-shek, see Yen Chia-kan, Hou Chiu-yuan, and Ch'en Tsung-
han (eds), Chiang T'sung-t'ung yu Chung-kuo min-sheng chien-she (President Chiang and 
Raising the Livelihood of the Chinese People) (Taipei: Yu-t'ai, 1967). 
63. John C.H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Growth with Equity: The 
Taiwan Case (New York: Oxford, 1979). 
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